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I. The Rise of the Economic Loss Rule
In an effort to resolve its uncertainties, tort scholars and jurists have
recently focused on what is often called "the economic loss rule."' According
1. See Jay M. Feinman, The Economic Loss Rule and Private Ordering, 48 ARIz. L. REV.
813, 813-26 (2006) (describing the history, rationale, application, and debates about the
economic loss rule); Oscar S. Gray, Some Thoughts on "The Economic Loss Rule" and
Apportionment, 48 AIuz. L. REv. 897, 897-903 (2006) (discussing the economic loss rule in the
context of the proposed Restatement); see also Anita Bernstein, Keep It Simple: An
Explanation of the Rule of No Recovery for Pure Economic Loss, 48 ARIz. L. REv. 773, 774-
809 (2006) (discussing the justifications for the economic loss rule); Ellen M. Bublick,
Economic Torts: Gains in Understanding Losses, 48 ARIz. L. REv. 693, 696-712 (2006)
(discussing the conflict among scholars over economic tort liability); Dan B. Dobbs, An
Introduction to Non-Statutory Economic Loss Claims, 48 ARIZ. L. REv. 713, 713-33 (2006)
(summarizing the economic loss rules); Mark P. Gergen, The Ambit of Negligence Liability for
Pure Economic Loss, 48 ARIz. L. REv. 749, 749-71 (2006) (suggesting "general criteria to
define when an actor is subject to negligence liability for pure economic loss"); David Gruning,
Pure Economic Loss in American Tort Law: An Unstable Consensus, 54 SuPP. Am. J. CoMP. L.
187, 188-208 (2006) (discussing the economic loss rule in American tort law); Thomas J.
Miles, Posner on Economic Loss: EVRA Corp v. Swiss Bank, 74 U. CHi. L. REv. 1813, 1813-
29 (2007) (clarifying the economic loss rule through examination of an opinion by Posner);
Ellen S. Pryor, The Economic Loss Rule and Liability Insurance, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 905,906-24
(2006) (examining "how the liability insurance regime fails to effectively translate... the
structure and purposes of the economic loss rule"); Robert L. Rabin, Respecting Boundaries and
the Economic Loss Rule in Tort, 48 ARIz. L. REv. 857, 858-69 (2006) (commenting on the
economic loss rule and its rationale). Authorities use the terms "economic loss rule" and
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to some authorities, the rule holds that tort law offers no redress for
negligence that causes only economic losses2 unaccompanied by personal
injuries or property damages.3 However, whether a rule so expansive is part
of American tort law is still open to doubt.4 There are many variations of the
"economic loss doctrine" interchangeably.
2. See Giles v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 494 F.3d 865, 873 (9th Cir. 2007) ("The
term 'economic loss' refers to damages that are solely monetary, as opposed to damages
involving physical harm to person or property.").
3. See Adams v. Copper Beach Townhome Cmtys., L.P., 816 A.2d 301, 305 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2003) (stating that "[tihe Economic Loss Doctrine provides that no cause of action exists for
negligence that results solely in economic damages unaccompanied by physical injury or
property damage," and that employees' claims for lost wages resulting from the shutdown of a
plant caused by flooding were barred); Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Hughes, Watters & Askanase,
L.L.P., No. 11 -05-00044-CV, 2006 WL 1914689, at *2 (Tex. App. July 13, 2006) (stating that
"[t]he economic loss rule provides that, in tort cases, economic damages are not recoverable
unless they are accompanied by actual physical injury or property damage"); see also Sovereign
Bank v. BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc., 533 F.3d 162, 175-78 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that the
economic loss rule barred a negligence claim by a bank against a merchant that failed to protect
cardholder information because the action sought damages only for economic losses, including
the costs of issuing new debit cards and reimbursing cardholders for unauthorized charges); In
re TJX Cos. Retail Sec. Breach Litig., 524 F. Supp. 2d 83, 92 (D. Mass. 2007) (same);
Banknorth, N.A. v. BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc. 442 F. Supp. 2d 206, 208 (M.D. Pa. 2006)
(same); Pa. State Employees Credit Union v. Fifth Third Bank, 398 F. Supp. 2d 317, 326-30
(M.D. Pa. 2005) (same); 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Ctr., Inc., 750
N.E.2d 1097, 1103 (N.Y. 2001) (holding, in a case where a construction collapse resulted in
street closures and adversely affected the plaintiffs' local businesses, "plaintiffs' negligence
claims based on economic loss alone fall beyond the scope of the duty owed them by defendants
and should be dismissed"). See generally Feinman, supra note 1, at 813 (opining that "[t]he
most general statement of the economic loss rule is that a person who suffers only pecuniary
loss through the failure of another person to exercise reasonable care has no tort cause of action
against that person"); Ann O'Brien, Note, Limited Recovery Rule as a Dam: Preventing a
Flood of Litigation for Negligent Infliction of Pure Economic Loss, 31 ARIz. L. REv. 959, 959
(1989) ("Under the majority rule, a plaintiff may recover economic losses for negligence only
when there is accompanying physical damage to person or property.").
4. See Giles, 494 F.3d at 874-75 (noting that "many courts have stated in overly broad
terms that purely economic losses cannot be recovered in tort" and that "[s]uch broad statements
are not accurate").
Professor Oscar S. Gray, a leading torts scholar, has expressed misgivings about attempts
to formulate a unified economic loss rule. See Gray, supra note 1, at 901-02. He wrote:
I had not previously thought that there was any such thing as a single "economic
loss rule." Instead, I had thought that there was a constellation of somewhat similar
doctrines that tend to limit liability, in the case of purely economic loss, from what
might have been expected under Palsgraf in the case of physical loss. These
doctrines seemed to work in somewhat different ways in different contexts, for
similar but not necessarily identical reasons, with exceptions where the reasons for
limiting liability were absent.
Id. at 898 (citations omitted).
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rule, 5 and courts often discuss its parameters only in relationship to products
6
liability or contractual performance. As one scholar remarked, the law of
tort liability for purely economic losses is "much less well settled and less
uniform than one might wish it to be."7
A. Three Areas of Concern
An examination of the economic loss rule entails at least three areas of
concern. The first is whether purely economic losses caused by a defective
product are recoverable under tort law. As discussed below, there is a high
degree of agreement that the answer to this question is "no" absent personal
injury or damage to other property.8
The second area of concern relates to whether a tort claim for economic
damages is viable when there is some other contract between the parties (e.g.,
a service contract or a contract relating to non-defective goods or real estate)
that allocates or could have allocated the risks of economic loss. As to these
matters, there is a consensus that the breach of a purely contractual duty is
not actionable as a tort if the only consequences are economic losses.
9
However, that modicum of agreement quickly dissolves as application of the
rule is charted. There are numerous competing formulations. For example,
Colorado holds that "a party suffering only economic loss from the breach of
an express or implied contractual duty may not assert a tort claim for such a
breach absent an independent duty of care under tort law."' 0 Wisconsin,
taking a different tack, says the economic loss doctrine bars a plaintiff's tort
cause of action if the "claimed damages are the result of disappointed
expectations of a bargained-for product's performance."" In Washington
state, "the purpose of the economic loss rule is to bar recovery for alleged
5. Cf Pryor, supra note 1, at 915 (reporting that "different versions of the economic loss
rule exist").
6. See Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Am. Aviation, Inc., 891 So. 2d 532, 543 (Fla. 2004)
(holding that cases falling outside of the products liability or contracts context "should be
decided on traditional negligence principles of duty, breach, and proximate cause").
7. Herbert Bernstein, Civil Liability for Pure Economic Loss UnderAmerican Tort Law,
46 AM. J. CoMP. L. 111, 125 (1998).
8. See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing recovery for "product-related economic losses").
9. See infra Part III.C.2 (discussing "purely contractual duties").
10. Town of Alma v. AZCO Constr., Inc., 10 P.3d 1256, 1264 (Colo. 2000).
11. See Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 699 N.W.2d 167, 180 (Wis. 2005) (holding that tort
claims relating to injuries sustained by calves who were fed with a defective milk substitute
were barred by the economic loss rule).
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breach of tort duties where a contractual relationship exists and the losses are
economic losses." 12 Some states endorse the view that "the economic loss
doctrine is inapplicable to claims for the negligent provision of services,"' 3
and thus apply the rule only in cases involving contracts for the sale of
goods.
14
The remaining area of concern is all of the rest of tort law, everything
beyond defective product- or contract-related claims. In this vast residual
territory,' 5 the operation of the economic loss rule is not well mapped, and
whether there is a "rule" at all is a subject of contention.' 6 The Supreme
Court of Florida has expressly held that the economic loss rule does not apply
outside the defective product or contract contexts.' 7 Other courts state the
rule so broadly that they seem certain that it applies to cases in this third
category that have not yet been conceived. 18 In most states, there is precedent
12. Alejandre v. Bull, 153 P.3d 864, 868 (Wash. 2007).
13. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Cease Elec. Inc., 688 N.W.2d 462, 472 (Wis. 2004); see also
Indem. Ins. Co. ofN. Am.v. Am. Aviation, Inc., 891 So. 2d 532, 544-45 (Fla. 2004) (Cantero,
J., concurring) (stating that "the economic loss rule does not apply in the services context unless
a contract exists and none of the established exceptions to the rule apply" and indicating that
"[t]he vast majority of states restrict the rule to products cases, at least in the absence of a
contract"). But see Banknorth, N.A. v. BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc. 442 F. Supp. 2d 206, 212
(M.D. Pa. 2006) (agreeing "that the economic loss rule can be extended to service contracts");
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. SEC Donohue, Inc., 679 N.E.2d 1197, 1200 (Ill. 1997) ("The policy
interest supporting the ability to comprehensively define a relationship in a service contract
parallels the policy interest supporting the ability to comprehensively define a relationship in a
contract for the sale of goods" and "[i]t is appropriate, therefore, that [the economic loss
doctrine] should apply to the service industry").
14. The product versus service distinction is also crucial in the law of products liability,
and the jurisprudence from that area would presumably inform cases dealing with the same issue
for purposes of the economic loss rule. See Charles E. Cantu, A New Look at an Old
Conundrum: The Determinative Test for the Hybrid Sales/Service Transaction Under Section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 45 ARK. L. REv. 913,915-16 (1993) (discussing the
decision of courts to apply strict liability in the product, but not services, context).
15. See Bernstein, supra note 1, at 782-93 (discussing the taxonomy of claims for
unintentionally inflicted economic loss and identifying, beyond the category of cases involving
"a contract-like relation between plaintiff and defendant," two other categories involving
"impediments to the plaintiff's regular business operations" and "emotions mixed with financial
loss").
16. But see Dobbs, supra note 1, at 714 (asserting that "[s]ubjectto qualifications, one not
in a special or contractual relationship owes no duty of care to protect strangers against stand-
alone economic harm").
17. See Aviation, 891 So. 2d at 543 (holding that cases that do not fall into the categories
of products liability and contractual privity "should be decided on traditional negligence
principles of duty, breach, and proximate cause"); see also Giles v. Gen. Motors Acceptance
Corp., 494 F.3d 865, 873 (9th Cir. 2007) ("Some jurisdictions have yet to apply the economic
loss doctrine outside the product liability context.").
18. See Adams v. Copper Beach Townhome Cmtys., L.P., 816 A.2d 301,305 (Pa. Super.
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sympathetic to the idea that the economic loss rule might apply in this residual field,
such as the decisions holding that negligent interference with contract is not
actionable,' 9 or case law that saves persons who cause transportation accidents from
liability for the economic losses of persons relegated to alternate routes.20 But it is
far from resolved whether these pockets of no liability mean that there is a general
rule, broadly applicable,21 against tort liability for purely economic losses in
22contexts unrelated to product defects or contractual performance.
B. Types of Tort Claims Barred
The economic loss rule, to the extent that it is recognized, is even more
expansive than first stated.23 The rule generally bars strict liability24 claims, as well
as negligence. 25 This makes sense because strict liability, at least in the defective
products, misrepresentation, and hazardous activities contexts, is merely a doctrinal
substitute for negligence principles, which may make resolution of liability issues
Ct. 2003) (stating the rule broadly and barring a claim for lost wages resulting from a plant
shutdown).
19. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766C (1979) (stating that a person "is not
liable to another for pecuniary harm not deriving from physical harm to the other, if that harm
results from the actor's negligently" interfering with the other's contract).
20. See Kinsman Transit v. City of Buffalo (Kinsman No. 2), 388 F.2d 821, 824-25 (2d
Cir. 1968) (denying recovery of alternate transportation costs incurred by third parties as the
result of the negligent destruction of a bridge).
21. Cf Bernstein, supra note 1, at 809 ("Economic loss is a category of encyclopedic
breadth within Torts. Because business entities as well as human beings can experience
economic loss, the number of potential litigants and the dollar value of damages that could be
alleged are both larger than their counterparts in personal-injury litigation.").
22. Cf Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Am. Aviation, Inc., 891 So. 2d 532,542 (Fla. 2004)
(emphasizing the "genuine, but limited" value of the economic loss rule).
23. See Stewart I. Edelstein, Beware the Economic Loss Rule, TRiAL, June 2006, at 42,42
(2006) (stating that under the economic loss rule "[d]amages for economic loss are not
recoverable on [any] tort theory when unaccompanied by physical property damage or personal
injury").
24. See E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 876 (1986)
(rejecting a strict products liability claim in admiralty for pure economic loss); Aldrich v. ADD
Inc., 770 N.E.2d 447, 454 (Mass. 2002) (holding that in Massachusetts, in accordance with the
majority of jurisdictions that have considered this issue, "purely economic losses are
unrecoverable in tort and strict liability actions in the absence of personal injury or property
damage," but finding that a claim against architects based on negligent design was not barred
because the plaintiffs alleged that water leakage caused property damage); Grams v. Milk
Prods., Inc., 699 N.W.2d 167, 169-70 (Wis. 2005) (holding that claims for "strict liability tort"
and "strict responsibility misrepresentation" were barred).
25. See Giles v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 494 F.3d 865, 873-75 (9th Cir. 2007)
(stating that courts apply the economic loss doctrine to negligence claims).
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more efficient or more certain.26 In cases where purely economic losses are caused
by a defective product, misrepresentation,27 or an abnormally dangerous activity, it
is logical that if tort claims based on negligence are barred by the rule, claims based
on tort strict liability should be foreclosed, too.
Some authorities have taken the extreme position that the economic loss rule
precludes recovery even for purely economic losses caused by intentionally tortious
conduct.28 Not surprisingly, other decisions employing various rationales are to the
contrary.29 In cases where economic losses are deliberately and tortiously inflicted
there is little reason to save the defendant from liability, whether under the
economic loss rule or otherwise.30
C. Doubts and Exceptions
Doubts about the coherence of a generally applicable economic loss rule have
frequently been raised.31 Those concerns are bolstered by the fact that any broad
26. See VINCENT R. JOHNSON & ALAN GuNN, STUDiEs IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 657 (3d ed.
2005) (discussing the policy basis for strict liability).
27. See Alejandre v. Bull, 153 P.3d 864, 872-73 (Wash. 2007) ("[W]e hold that the
economic loss rule applies and forecloses the buyers' claim that the seller negligently
misrepresented the condition of the septic system.").
28. See Grams, 699 N.W.2d at 169-70 (holding that a claim for intentional
misrepresentation was barred). But see Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Am. Aviation, Inc., 891
So. 2d 532, 543 n.3 (Fla. 2004) ("Intentional tort claims such as fraud, conversion, intentional
interference, civil theft, abuse of process, and other torts requiring proof of intent generally
remain viable either in the products liability context or if the parties are in privity of contract"
because "a rule barring recovery for economic loss 'is not an escape hatch from intentional
commercial torts"').
29. See Gulf Coast Produce, Inc. v. Am. Growers, Inc., No. 07-80633-CIV, 2008 WL
660100, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 7, 2008) (stating that the economic loss rule is inapplicable to a
conversion claim); Carran v. Morgan, 510 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1060-61 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (stating
that the economic loss rule is inapplicable to breach of fiduciary duty, constructive trust, fraud,
and conversion claims); see also Giles, 494 F.3d at 875 ("Many courts have explicitly refused to
extend the economic loss doctrine beyond the product liability context or beyond claims for
negligence and strict liability.").
30. See Gruning, supra note 1, at 187 ("Sometimes compensation for economic losses
presents no special difficulty. This is so, for example, when economic losses follow an
intentional tort whose goal was to produce that very harm.").
31. See Colleton Preparatory Acad., Inc. v. Hoover Universal, Inc., No. 26535, 2007 WL
5433193, at *3 (S.C. Aug. 25, 2008) (noting that the court had "continually expressed
uneasiness with the economic loss doctrine" and that, as a result, the court had "partially
rejected the rule in the residential home building context, leaving it viable in situations where a
builder violates only a contractual duty"). Some courts have argued that the term "economic
loss rule" causes confusion. See Town of Alma v. AZCO Constr., Inc., 10 P.3d 1256, 1262-63
(Colo. 2000) ("The phrase 'economic loss rule' necessarily implies that the focus of the inquiry
under its analysis is on the type of damages suffered by the aggrieved party. However, the
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statement of the rule must be qualified by important, well-recognized exceptions. 32
Not the least of these qualifications are the causes of action imposing liability for
negligent misrepresentation, 33 defamation,3 4 professional malpractice,35 breach of
relationship between the type of damages suffered and the availability of a tort action is inexact at
best."); see also Pryor, supra note 1, at 905 (noting that one of the challenges to restating the
economic loss rule is "whether its normative bases are coherent (both for the rule and for its
'exceptions')").
32. See generally Vincent R. Johnson, Cybersecurity, Identity Theft, and the Limits of Tort
Liability, 57 S.C. L. REv. 255, 302-03 (2005) (discussing exceptions and limitations to the
economic loss rule).
33. See, e.g., Level 3 Commc'ns, LLC v. Liebert Corp., 535 F.3d 1146, 1161 (10th Cir.
2008) (finding that the economic loss rule did not bar a negligent misrepresentation claim); ATM
Exch., Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n, No. 1:05-CV-00732, 2008 WL 3843530, at *14 (S.D. Ohio
Aug. 14, 2008) (same); In re TJX Cos. Retail Sec. Breach Litig., 524 F. Supp. 2d 83, 91-92 (D.
Mass. 2007) (same); Bilt-Rite Contractors, Inc. v. The Architectural Studio, 866 A.2d 270,285 (Pa.
2005) (same); see also Robert A. Prentice & Veronica J. Finkelstein, Architects Lose the
Economic-Loss Rule Shield in Pennsylvania, 76 PA. BAR AsS'N Q. 180, 182 (Oct. 2005)
(discussing the impact on design professionals of judicial recognition of a negligent
misrepresentation exception in some states). But see Smith v. John Hancock Ins. Co., No. 06-3876,
2008 WL 4072585, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 2, 2008) (holding that a claim for negligent
misrepresentation was barred by the economic loss rule); Alejandre v. Bull, 153 P.3d 864, 870
(Wash. 2007) (holding that a claim for negligent misrepresentation "is not available when the
parties have contracted against potential economic liability"). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR EcoN. Loss § 10 (Preliminary Draft No. 1, 2005) (discussing liability for
negligent misstatements).
34. The Constitution only requires proof of negligence as to falsity in a libel or slander action
brought by a private person suing with regard to a matter of public concern. See Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,347 (1974) (stating that "so long as they do not impose liability without
fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher.., of
defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual"). The culpability requirement in cases
involving matters of private concern has not been definitively resolved by the United States
Supreme Court, but it is certainly not higher than negligence. Cf Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 781 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that neither
the parties nor the lower courts suggested that an actual malice standard applied). The damages
recoverable in defamation actions where negligence is shown include economic losses. See Travis
M. Wheeler, Note, Negligent Injury to Reputation: Defamation Priority and the Economic Loss
Rule, 48 ARiz. L. REV. 1103, 1103-04 (2006) (discussing the application of the economic loss rule
to "cases in which plaintiffs seek reputational damages without pleading defamation"); cf Gertz,
418 U.S. at 349-50 (stating that constitutional principles "restrict defamation plaintiffs who do not
prove knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth to compensation for actual injury...
[which] is not limited to out-of-pocket loss").
35. This includes legal malpractice. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Holland & Knight, 832 F.
Supp. 1528, 1532 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (finding the economic loss rule inapplicable); Collins v.
Reynard, 607 N.E.2d 1185, 1187 (Ill. 1992) (finding the rule inapplicable); Clark v. Rowe, 701
N.E.2d 624, 627 (Mass. 1998) (stating that the "general rule in this country is that the economic
loss rule is inapplicable to claims of legal malpractice"); see also Thome v. Wagner, No. 2:06-CV-
00942-PMP-PAL, 2007 WL 496373, at *5 (D. Nev. Feb. 13,2007) (finding the rule inapplicable
because the invalidity of a divorce did not cause "purely economic losses" as the plaintiff allegedly
suffered "physical and emotional trauma requiring medical care"). But see Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v.
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fiduciary duty,3 6 nuisance," loss of consortium, 38 wrongful death,39 spoliation of
Hughes, Watters & Askanase, L.L.P., No. 11-05-00044-CV, 2006 WL 1914689, at *4 (Tex. App.
July 13, 2006) (holding that the rule barred an insurer's subrogation claim for legal malpractice). It
also includes accounting malpractice. See Congregation of the Passion, Holy Cross Province v.
Touche Ross & Co., 636 N.E.2d 503, 514 (111. 1994) (finding that the economic loss doctrine did
not prevent plaintiff from recovering for accounting malpractice claim). Finally, this also includes
engineering malpractice. See Tommy L. Griffin Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Jordan, Jones &
Goulding, Inc., 463 S.E.2d 85, 89 (S.C. 1995) (stating that the economic loss doctrine did not bar
plaintiff's engineering malpractice claim). But see Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. SEC Donohue, Inc.,
679 N.E.2d 1197, 1200-01 (111. 1997) (stating that the economic loss rule applies to engineers);
Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. DeLanney, 809 S.W.2d 493, 494 n.1 (Tex. 1991) (observing in a case
involving the economic loss rule that "some contracts involve special relationships that may give
rise to duties enforceable as torts, such as professional malpractice").
36. See Derkevorkian v. Lionbridge Techs., Inc., No. 04-CV-01 160-LTB-CBS, 2007 WL
638717, at *4 (D. Colo. Feb. 27, 2007) (finding that the economic loss rule did not bar a "breach of
fiduciary duty claim based on a confidential or trust relationship independent of the parties'
contractual relationship"); Twin Fires Inv., LLC v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., No.
00075 IF, 2001 WL 1249303, at *4-5 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 26, 2001) (stating that a claim for
breach of fiduciary duty was not barred by the economic loss rule). But see Action Nissan, Inc. v.
Hyundai Motor Am., No. 6:06-CV- 1747-ORL- 19KRS, 2008 WL 4093702, at * 11-* 12 (M.D. Fla.
Aug. 29, 2008) (stating that "[w]hile the economic loss rule does not automatically bar a breach of
fiduciary duty claim, the rule does apply when the claim for breach of fiduciary duty is based upon
and inextricably intertwined with the claim for breach of contract," and finding that the plaintiffs
claim was barred); In re Trade Partners, Inc. Investors Litig., No. 1:07-MD-1846, 2008 WL
3 875396, at *17 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 15, 2008) (finding that because a trust agreement did not
impose any duties beyond contractual duties, the plaintiff's claims for negligence, gross negligence,
and breach of fiduciary duty were barred by the economic loss doctrine); PNC Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v.
Colonial Bank, N.A., No. 8:08-CV-61 1-T-24MSS, 2008 WL 2917639, at *4 (M.D. Fla. July 24,
2008) ("[Plaintiff's] breach of trust claim is substantially indistinguishable from its breach of
contract claim and is therefore barred by the economic loss rule.").
37. See Holcomb Constr. Co. v. Armstrong, 590 F.2d 811, 812 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding that
a cause of action for nuisance was stated based on negligent damage to a bridge which compelled
the plaintiff to use a "circuitous route for the transportation of materials," which resulted in "greater
cost"); Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 370 F. Supp. 247, 250 (D. Me. 1973) (allowing fishermen and
clamdiggers to recover economic losses resulting from water pollution); Leo v. Gen. Elec. Co., 538
N.Y.S.2d 844, 847 (App. Div. 1989) (allowing fishermen to sue for "diminution or loss of
livelihood" caused by water pollution). Where the action is for public nuisance, rather than private
nuisance, the plaintiff's action will fail unless the plaintiff establishes "special damages beyond
those suffered by the public" in general. See 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia
Ctr., Inc., 750 N.E.2d 1097, 1104 (N.Y. 2001) (denying recovery for economic harm to local
businesses caused by a construction collapse). See generally In re Exxon Valdez, 104 F.3d 1196,
1197 (9th Cir. 1997) (refusing to award noneconomic damages based on harm to communal life
resulting from a negligent oil spill, but noting that there was "no dispute concerning the Alaska
Natives' right to recover economic damage flowing from loss of fishing resources").
38. See, e.g., Wolfgang v. Mid-Am. Motorsports, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 434,438 (D. Kan. 1996)
(stating that "Kansas recognizes that there are economic and noneconomic components to a loss of
consortium claim").
39. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 572 N.E.2d 598, 599 (N.Y. 1991)
(approving a substantial wrongful-death award to the independent, adult grandchildren of a
brutally murdered woman from whom they had previously received meals, advice, and other
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evidence,4" and unreasonable failure to settle a claim within insurance policy
limits,41 all of which may afford recovery for negligence causing purely economic
losses to the plaintiff. So too, statutory causes of action, even when based on
negligence 42 or strict liability43 principles, usually trump the judicially designed
economic loss rule.44 Courts also find that negligence causing purely economic




40. See, e.g., Holmes v. Amerex Rent-A-Car, 710 A.2d 846, 854 (D.C. 1998)
(recognizing an action for economic damages caused by reckless or negligent spoliation of
evidence). Some states have declined to endorse this cause of action. See Trevino v. Ortega,
969 S.W.2d 950, 959 (Tex. 1998) (opting for procedural sanctions for spoliation of evidence).
41. See Pratham Design Innovation Pvt. Ltd. v. Infovision 21, Inc., No. 07-CV-13282,
2007 WL 4557712, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 21,2007) (stating that the "common law duty in tort
arises in the insurance context" (citing Battista v. Lebanon Trotting Ass'n, 538 F.2d 111, 117
(6th Cir. 1976))).
42. For example, an Illinois statute imposes negligence-based obligations to protect data
from unauthorized access and permits recovery of economic losses resulting from a breach. See
815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/10a(a) (2008).
43. See ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.822 (LexisNexis 2008) (providing for strict liability for
certain economic losses related to the release of hazardous substances); see also Kodiak Island
Borough v. Exxon Corp., 991 P.2d 757, 769 (Alaska 1999) (concluding that in "allowing
recovery for purely economic damages, Alaska's hazardous substances statutes do not unduly
interfere with the harmony or uniformity of federal maritime law").
44. See In re Ford Motor Co. E-350 Van Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. II), No. 03-4558, 2008
WL 4126264, at *29 (D.N.J. Sept. 2, 2008) (concluding that the economic loss rule did not bar
a claim under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act); PNC Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v. Colonial Bank,
N.A., 2008 WL 2917639, at *4 (M.D. Fla. July 24, 2008) (stating principle in dicta); Indem.
Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Am. Aviation, Inc., 891 So. 2d 532, 543 n.3 (Fla. 2004) (recognizing the
principle). But see Butcher v. DaimlerChrysler Co., LLC, No. 1:08-CV-207, 2008 WL
2953472, at *4 (M.D.N.C. July 29, 2008) (finding that under North Carolina law, the economic
loss rule bars a claim under the state deceptive trade practices act for economic losses);
Natarajan v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., No. 8:04-CV-2612-T-1 7TGW, 2008 WL 2885704, at *2
(M.D. Fla. July 24, 2008) (finding that RICO claims not based on acts independent of a breach
of contract were barred by the economic loss rule).
45. See Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 565 (9th Cir. 1974) (discussing the
"special relationship exception"). In Union Oil, the court wrote:
Prosser recognizes that a recovery for pure economic losses in negligence has been
permitted in instances in which there exists "some special relation between the
parties ..... " The failure of the plaintiffto obtain a contract because of a telegraph
company's negligent transmission of a message has been held to be legally
cognizable, and is cited as an example of the "special relationship"
qualification .... Other examples which have been cited are the negligent failure
to perform a gratuitous promise to obtain insurance, and the negligent delay in
acting upon an application for insurance.
Id. (citations omitted).
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If the economic loss rule is held to bar intentional tort claims as well
as ones founded on negligence, the list of exceptions must even be greater.
Intentional tort actions based on fraudulent misrepresentation, 46 tortious
interference with contract47  or with prospective advantage,4 8  and
46. See Granite Cos. v. City Capital Corp., No. 07-3078, 2008 WL 3285914, at *3 (E.D.
Pa. Aug. 8,2008) (finding that a fraud in the inducement claim was viable); MyVitaNet.com v.
Kowalski, No. 2:08-CV-48, 2008 WL 2977889, at *9 (S.D. Ohio July 29, 2008) (concluding
that the plaintiff's claims for fraud and intentional misrepresentation were plausible grounds for
relief because they sought "damages that extend beyond only economic loss"); EED Holdings v.
Palmer Johnson Acquisition Corp., 387 F. Supp. 2d 265, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (stating that
"New York courts have routinely permitted fraud and contract claims to proceed in tandem for
the purpose of recovering pure economic loss" and concluding that a fraud claim was not barred
by the rule); Robinson Helicopter Co. v. Dana Corp., 102 P.3d 268, 274 (Cal. 2004) (holding
that the economic loss rule does not bar fraud and intentional misrepresentation claims);
Alejandre v. Bull, 153 P.3d 864, 866 (Wash. 2007) (recognizing that fraudulent concealment is
an exception to the economic loss rule, but finding that the plaintiffs failed to prove fraud).
In some jurisdictions, fraud in the inducement may be treated differently than fraud in the
performance. See D & M Jupiter, Inc. v. Friedopfer, 853 So. 2d 485, 487-88 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2003) (stating that "'[w]hen the fraud relates to the performance of the contract, the
economic loss doctrine"' limits parties to contractual remedies, but fraud from
"'misrepresentations, statements, or omissions which cause the complaining party to enter into a
transaction.., is fraud in the inducement and survives as an independent tort"' (quoting Allen
v. Stephan Co., 784 So. 2d 456, 457 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000))); see also Gen. Elec. Corp. v.
BASF Corp., No. 06-CV-283-NRB, 2008 WL 4185870, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2008)
(finding that "the distinction between fraud-in-the-inducement and fraud-in-the-performance is
currently the state of law in New Jersey"); In re Biddiscombe Int'l., L.L.C., 392 B.R. 909, 916
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2008) (concluding that the "economic loss rule does not bar the tort of
fraudulent inducement"); Hotels of Key Largo, Inc. v. RHI Hotels, Inc., 694 So. 2d 74, 78 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (stating that "[m]isrepresentations relating to the breaching party's
performance of a contract do not give rise to an independent cause of action in tort,... [as they]
are indistinct from the heart of the contractual agreement," and, therefore, the economic loss rule
applies and limits the parties to contractual remedies). See generally Christopher W. Arledge, Is
the California Supreme Court Confusing the Boundaries of the Economic Loss Rule?, 47
ORANGE COUNTY LAWYER 22, 24 (May 2005) (criticizing a decision holding that the economic
loss rule did not bar a fraud claim that arose in the context of a contract for the sale of goods);
R. Joseph Barton, Note, Drowning in a Sea of Contract: Application of the Economic Loss
Rule to Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation Claims, 41 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1789, 1789
(2000) (describing the economic loss rule as "one of the most confusing doctrines in tort law").
47. See Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc. v. Beech St. Corp., 899 So. 2d 1222,
1228-29 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that the rule did not bar a health care provider from
suing the administrator of the state's group health insurance program for tortious interference
with contract); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1979) ("One who intentionally and
improperly interferes with the performance of a contract... between another and a third
person... is subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the
failure of the third person to perform the contract.").
48. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766B (1979) ("One who intentionally and
improperly interferes with another's prospective contractual relation . . . is subject to
liability... whether the interference consists of(a) inducing or otherwise causing a third person
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conversion 49 routinely allow recovery of purely economic losses.5° Moreover,
theories of secondary liability, such as intentionally aiding and abetting a
breach of fiduciary duty,5' may make a defendant liable to a plaintiff for purely
economic harm. This multitude of exceptions means that, contrary to the view
of some writers, the economic loss rule, in operation rather than theory, does
not provide a "clear and predictable limit to liability."52
D. One Rule or Several?
The truth may be that there is not one economic loss rule broadly applicable
throughout the field of torts, but rather several more limited rules that govern
not to enter into or continue the prospective relation or (b) preventing the other from acquiring
or continuing the prospective relation.").
49. See Giles v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 494 F.3d 865, 879-80 (9th Cir. 2007)
(holding that conversion and fraud claims were not barred by the economic loss rule); Alex
Hofrichter, P.A. v. Zuckerman & Venditti, P.A., 710 So. 2d 127, 127 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)
(stating that the economic loss rule did not bar claims for conversion, civil theft, and
constructive fraud where a lawyer converted partnership funds to personal use). But see PNC
Bank, N.A. v. Colonial Bank, N.A., No. 8:08-CV-61 1-T-24MSS, 2008 WL 2917639, at *3
(M.D. Fla. July 24, 2008) (finding that a conversion claim was barred by the economic loss rule
where it related "directly to the performance of the Agreement and is therefore 'exactly
coextensive' with ... [the plaintiff's] breach of contract claim" (quoting Future Tech Int'l, Inc.
v. Tae I1 Media, Ltd., 944 F. Supp. 1538, 1569 (S.D. Fla. 1996))).
50. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774A(l) (1979) (providing that contract
interference renders one liable "for damages for (a) the pecuniary loss of the benefits of the
contract or the prospective relation; (b) consequential losses for which the interference is a legal
cause; and (c) emotional distress or actual harm to reputation").
51. See Katarina P. Lewinbuk, Let's Sue All the Lawyers: The Rise of Claims Against
Lawyers for Aiding and Abetting a Client's Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 40 ARIz. ST. L.J. 135,
146 (2008) ("The critical distinction between a regular legal malpractice claim and a claim
against an attorney for aiding and abetting her client's breach of fiduciary duty is that 'there
need be no allegation that the attorney actually owed the plaintiff a direct duty of care"' (quoting
David Grossbaum, Partner, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Conspiring to Commit orAiding and
Abetting a Client's Breach of Fiduciary Duty: Defending Such Claims Against Attorneys,
Presentation at Hinshaw's 2006 Legal Malpractice & Risk Management Conference, at 3 (Mar.
2, 2006))); Douglas R. Richmond, Lawyer Liability for Aiding and Abetting Clients'
Misconduct Under State Law, 75 DEF. CoUNS. 1. 130, 130(2008) ("[T]he theory gained serious
traction during the savings and loan crisis of the mid- to late 1980's and early 1990's, when
government regulators and private plaintiffs sued numerous law and accounting firms for their
alleged roles in institutional failures principally attributable to corrupt directors and officers.").
52. See Daniel London, Is the Economic Loss Rule in Peril? Courts, Negligence and the
Economic Loss Wolves, 71 DEF. CouNs. J. 379, 380 (2004) (discussing the historical continuity
of courts' application of the economic loss doctrine).
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recovery of economic losses in selected areas of the law.53 For example, the rules
that limit the liability of accountants to third parties for harm caused by negligences4
or that save careless drivers from liability to the employer of a person injured in an
auto accident55 may be fundamentally distinct from the ones that bar compensation
in tort for purely economic losses resulting from defective products56 or
misperformance of obligations arising only under contract.
5 7
For purposes of convenience, this Article will speak of the economic loss rule
in the singular, nevertheless recognizing that on the issue of whether there is one
rule or several, the jury is still out. Thoughtful voices doubt whether there is a
unitary theory58 and are arguing against the "crystallization" of a single rule.59
Indeed, the American Law Institute's project on tort liability for economic loss is
now in abeyance, following the resignation of the Reporter.60 None of the project's
53. See Dobbs, supra note 1, at 714 (discussing two "distinct" rules); Feinman, supra note
1, at 813 (opining that "there is not one economic loss rule, but several"); Gruning, supra note
1, at 208 ("American tort law displays many economic loss rules not merely because many states
contribute to their elaboration. It also displays many such rules because the problem of
economic loss itself is plural and variegated.").
54. In fact, courts differ in how they articulate the limits on the liability of accountants to
third parties. See Vincent R. Johnson & Shawn M. Lovorn, Misrepresentation by Lawyers
About Credentials or Experience, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 529, 566-67 (2004) (indicating that the
accounting liability cases tend to follow one of three views, which require either privity or near-
privity between the parties, foreseeability of reliance, or reliance by "one of a limited group of
persons for whose benefit the information was supplied").
55. See Castle v. Williams, 788 N.E.2d 421,424 (I11. Ct. App. 2003) ("[A] person who
tortiously causes physical harm to an agent is not liable to the principal for the harm thereby
caused to him"); see also Lauria v. Mandalay Corp., No. 07-817, 2008 WL 3887608, at *2
(D.N.J. Aug. 18, 2008) (stating that in the context of a slip and fall accident that "neither New
Jersey nor Nevada law would permit an employer to recover under a negligence theory for
economic losses solely derived from an injury to an employee").
56. See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing the boundary-line function in products liability
cases).
57. See infra note 109 and accompanying text (discussing parties' ability to bargain for
protection from economic harm).
58. See Rabin, supra note 1, at 859 (opining that "the constraints imposed by the
economic loss rule do not.., reflect any single normative principle" and "the cases do not
comprise a single generic category guided by a unified set of underlying policy considerations").
59. See, e.g., Gray, supra note 1, at 899 (claiming a singular expression of the economic
loss rule is neither dictated by precedent-given the diversity of rules articulated by courts-nor
desirable); Rabin, supra note 1, at 859 (suggesting that "attempts to generate a single rationale
for what the courts are doing run the risk of oversimplifying the policy concerns at stake").
60. According to the American Law Institute:
The Council approved the start of the project in 2004. Thus far, no part of the work
has been approved by the Council or by the membership. Professor Mark Gergen
resigned as the project's Reporter in late 2007; the project is in abeyance while the
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initial drafts6' were approved by the Institute. 62 The confusing63 mass of
precedent relating to tort liability for economic loss has yet to be disentangled
and expressed with the clarity commonly found with respect to other tort law
topics.
E. Abundant Litigation
The terms and scope of the economic loss rule may be the subject of
disagreement, but there is no dispute as to the underlying reality; recovery in
tort actions today for purely economic losses is often difficult to obtain.
64
Indeed, the obstacles posed by the economic loss rule or related principles
seem to loom ever larger.65 The economic loss rule was not even taught in
Director seeks a successor Reporter.
The American Law Institute, Current Projects, http://www.ali.org/index.cfn?fuseaction=
projects.proj ip&projectid=15 (last visited Nov. 10, 2008) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
61. Two drafts were submitted to the Members Consultative Group addressing the
economic loss rule. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LAB. FOR ECON. Loss § 8
(Preliminary Draft No. 1, 2005) ("An actor who accidentally causes pecuniary harm to another
that does not result from a wrongful injury to the person or property of the other is subject to
liability in tort for neglect of a duty of care to the other only as stated in §§ 9-21.");
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: ECON. TORTS AND RELATED WRONGS § 8(3) (Preliminary Draft
No. 2, 2006) ("An actor is subject to liability for solely pecuniary harm resulting from the
actor's breach of a duty of care ... or resulting from the actor's unreasonable conduct,
abnormally dangerous activity, or defective product."). Focusing on third-party cases, one
leading scholar described the position of Preliminary Draft No. I as "extreme" and Draft No. 2
as "less restrictive" and "narrower." Feinman, supra note 1, at 820. Two drafts were submitted
to the Council of the Institute. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: ECON. TORTS & RELATED
WRONGS § 8(3) (Council Draft No. 1, Oct. 2, 2006) ("An actor who unintentionally causes pure
economic loss is subject to liability in tort as described in §§ 9-2 1."); RESTATEMENT(THnRD) OF
TORTS: EcON. TORTS & RELATED WRONGS § 8(1) (Council Draft No. 2, Oct. 5, 2007) ("In
general, there is no liability in tort for pure economic loss caused unintentionally and without
dishonesty or disloyalty except as stated in §§ 9-23.").
62. See The American Law Institute, supra note 60 (stating that "[t]hus far, no part of the
work has been approved by the Council or by the membership").
63. See Indem. Ins. Co. ofN. Am. v. Am. Aviation, Inc., 891 So. 2d 532, 536 (Fla. 2004)
(asserting that "there has been much confusion about the scope of this doctrine"); Barton, supra
note 46, at 1789 (describing the economic loss rule as "one of the most confusing doctrines in
tort law").
64. See Bernstein, supra note 7, at 112 (opining that American law is "generally opposed
to recovery [for pure economic loss] on a negligence theory"); Gruning, supra note 1, at 187
(stating that "even clearly demonstrable economic losses that cannot be characterized as
dependent on physical harm to the plaintiff are generally not compensated").
65. See, e.g., Emily Kuwahara, Torts v. Contracts: Can Microsoft Be Held Liable to
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law schools as substantial legal principle a generation ago.66 However, today
it is covered in many tort casebooks 67 and presumably taught in many classes.
Home Consumers for Its Security Flaws, 80 S. CAL. L. REv. 997, 1025-31 (2007) (suggesting
that the economic loss rule would bar tort claims related to three forms of software-related cyber
attacks: deletion of files, misappropriation of data, and denial of service).
66. See Pryor, supra note 1, at 905 ("Over the past 25 years, the 'economic loss rule' has
created a sprawling caselaw, which has elevated it from its once-provincial role in products
liability to a dominant argument in all manner of economic harm cases."); see also Feinman,
supra note 1, at 815-17 (discussing the historical background of liability for third-party
economic loss and stating that "[u]ntil the 1950s, limiting doctrines such as privity and
restrictive liability rules in misrepresentation and negligence made it virtually impossible for a
third party to recover for negligently-inflicted economic loss").
The historical origins of the economic loss rule depend on the branch of the rule with
which one is concerned. The branch of the rule denying compensation for negligently caused
interference with contract has been traced to Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S.
303 (1927) (Holmes, J.). See Gruning, supra note 1, at 189-90 (discussing Robins). The
Robins line of development is reflected in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766C. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766C (1979) ("One is not liable to another for pecuniary
harm... result[ing] from the actor's negligently (a) causing a third person not to perform a
contract with the other, or (b) interfering with the other's performance of his contract .... or
(c) interfering with the other's acquiring a contractual relation with a third person.").
The branch of the rule denying compensation under tort law for harm caused by defective
products originated with Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 151 (Cal. 1965) (Traynor, J.).
See Congregation of the Passion, Holy Cross Province v. Touche Ross & Co., 636 N.E.2d 503,
512 (I11. 994) (discussing Seely); Town of Alma v. AZCO Constr., Inc., 10 P.3d 1256, 1259-
61 (Colo. 2000) (discussing the origins of the economic loss rule and explaining it as a limited
principle that preserved a proper sphere for contract law after the adoption of strict products
liability).
A pivotal event in the recent development of the economic loss rule was Justice Harry
Blackmun's opinion in East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S.
858, 876 (1986), which held that "whether stated in negligence or strict liability, no products-
liability claim lies in admiralty when the only injury claimed is economic loss." Id. That
decision, together with the previously established rule that negligent interference with contract
or prospective advantage is not actionable, catalyzed efforts to articulate a grander formulation
of an economic loss rule that applies beyond the fields of products liability or tortious
interference. See Giles v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 494 F.3d 865, 873 (9th Cir. 2007)
("The 'economic loss doctrine' as a separately named and articulated doctrine dates only from
the last half century.").
67. See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADVANCED
TORTS: ECONOMIC AND DIGNITARY TORTS 441-53 (2006) (discussing "products and the
Economic Loss Rule(s)"); JERRY J. PHILLIPS ET AL., TORT LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS
518-28 (3d ed. 2002) (discussing economic loss as a result of negligence); DAVID W.
ROBERTSON ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 253-71 (3d ed. 2004) (discussing
'economic loss without physical injury"); AARON D. TWERSKI & JAMES A. HENDERSON, TORTS:
CASES AND MATERIALS 318-36 (2003) (discussing "limitations on recovery for pure economic
loss").
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Litigants regularly assert the economic loss rule as a barrier to liability,68
often with success.69 So great is the ferment that Chief Justice Shirley S.
Abrahamson of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin noted that the economic loss
doctrine was an issue before her state high court or intermediate court forty-
seven times in a recent five-year period. 7° She lamented that at "the current
pace, the economic loss doctrine may consume much of tort law if left
unchecked."7
F. The Limits of the Economic Loss Rule
Of course, the obstacles to recovery posed by the economic loss rule
should be no greater than the justifications upon which the rule is founded.
72Cessante ratione legis cessat et ipsa lex. Not surprisingly, the confusion
over the terms of the rule is accompanied by further uncertainty as to the
reasons for the rule.73
Part II of this Article considers the justifications advanced in support of
the economic loss rule, and in particular the argument that the rule performs a
useful boundary-line function by determining when contract-law principles
supplant the law of torts. Focusing on the boundary-line rationale, this
68. See, e.g., In re Adelphia Commc'ns Corp., No. 02-B-41729,2008 WL 3919198, at *4
n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2008) (finding it unnecessary to address the appellee's arguments that
certain tort claims were barred by the economic loss rule, because the appellants conceded they
were not seeking tort damages); Mason v. Chase Bank, No. 05-07-01513-CV, 2008 WL
3412212, at *2 (Tex. App. Aug. 13, 2008) (noting the defendant's assertion that the rule was
grounds for summary judgment in a suit relating to a construction loan); King v. Rice, 191 P.3d
946, 951-52 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that the economic loss rule did not bar negligence
and malicious mischief claims related to destruction of a modular living unit).
69. See, e.g., Bryan's Quality Plus, LLC v. Shaffer Builders, Inc., No. 07-CV-2311,2008
WL 3523935, at *5 n. 10 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 12,2008) (noting that claims relating to a construction
dispute were barred by the economic loss rule).
70. Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 699 N.W.2d 167, 180 (Wis. 2005) (Abrahamson, C.J.,
dissenting) (citing a study of cases from 2000 to 2004).
71. Id. at 181 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting).
72. See Vargo v. Schwartz, 81 Pa. D. & C.4th 1, 12 n.7 (Pa. Com. Pl. 2007) (providing
the translation for the maxim as "where stops the reason, there stops the rule") (citing Brinkley
v. King, 701 A.2d 176, 181 (Pa. 1997)); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY App. B at 1708 (8th ed.
2004) (translating the maxim as "[w]hen the reason of the law ceases, the law itself also
ceases").
73. Cf. Bernstein, supra note 1, at 774 (stating that "pure economic loss 'remains a
backwater within the discourse of American tort law"' (quoting Gary T. Schwartz, American
Tort Law and the (Supposed) Economic Loss Rule, in PURE ECONOMIC Loss IN EUROPE 94, 96
(Mauro Bussani & Vernon Palmer eds., 2003))).
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Article addresses the application of the economic loss rule in a particular
range of cases. That range includes only those cases where the question is
whether the defendant owes the plaintiff no duty under tort law because a
particular contract (either with the plaintiff or with a third-party) defines the
extent of the defendant's obligation or because contract law generally is the
sole source of remedies for the harm of which the plaintiff complains. Thus, in
reference to the three categories of concern mentioned above,74 the analysis
relates mainly to categories one (sales of defective products) and two (other
contractual arrangements), and not to category three (the residual range of tort
cases where contractual principles are not being asserted as a limit on duty).
More specifically, because the law governing claims related to defective
products is so well established,75 the focus here is primarily on category two.
Part III of this Article probes the limits of the economic loss rule in
reference to its boundary-line function in three particular respects. First, the
Article argues, as some courts have recognized, that the rule generally should
not be an obstacle to recovery if the plaintiff was not a party to a contract with
the defendant that is alleged to be the exclusive source of duty.76 Not all courts
have agreed with this contention.
Second, the Article asserts that hypothetical remedies under contracts that
were never entered into should not bar recovery under tort principles.77 If there
was never an exercise of freedom to contract, there is no reason for tort law to
defer to private ordering. In many instances, but certainly not all, tort law is an
appropriate vehicle for remedying purely economic loss. Hypothetical
remedies under nonexistent contract should not preclude courts from
addressing the issue of whether the defendant breached a duty under tort law.
Third, courts have sometimes erred in ruling broadly that claims related to
independent tort duties78 are barred if the damages relate to the subject matter
74. See supra Part LA (defining the three areas of concern as product defects, torts
involving contractual obligations between the parties, and a residual category-inclusive of all
other tort claims not encompassed by the first two situations).
75. See infra Part II.C.2 (describing the economic loss rule as providing a clear boundary
line in product defects cases, allowing recovery in tort for defects causing physical harm, and
limiting a party to contractual remedies where the only harm suffered is economic).
76. See infra Part III.A (discussing cases where courts allow recovery in tort because the
plaintiff and defendant were not in privity).
77. See infra Part III.B (criticizing a court's decision barring a plaintiff from seeking
relief in negligence as contrary to American tort law and "com[ing] perilously close to saying
that contract law is the exclusive source of protection from economic losses").
78. See infra Part III.C. 1 (discussing cases where courts trace the source of the alleged
duty owed, finding the economic loss rule does not apply if the defendant owed the plaintiff a
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of an existing contract, 79 are based on the same facts as a breach of contract
claim,80 or involve "disappointed" commercial expectations 81 related to the
contract. This Article contends that the operation of the economic loss rule
in these kinds of cases (and whether relief in tort based on an independent
duty should be available notwithstanding the parties' contract) should be
guided by the principles that generally determine whether one body of law
displaces another. 82 These principles can be deduced from the jurisprudence
that determines whether federal law preempts state law, whether statutory
provisions replace common law, and whether a contractual release from
liability effectively waives tort rights. Remedies otherwise available under
tort law should not be foreclosed merely because a claim relates to the subject
matter or factual context of a contract or the expectations arising therefrom.
Rather, whether contract principles displace remedies based on an
independent tort duty should depend on the terms of the parties' agreement
and whether those terms are consistent with public policy. Only where a
contract expressly or by necessary implication elects to replace tort principles
actually or potentially establishing an independent duty should relief under
tort law for purely economic losses be barred by the economic loss rule.
Finally, Part VI urges courts to be vigilant in ensuring that an unrealistic and
unwarranted endorsement of contract principles does not undermine the fault
and deterrence policies that animate American tort law.
duty independent of contractual obligations).
79. See infra Part III.E. 1 (disagreeing with cases-where the parties were contractually
linked but the duty breached arose in tort--denying recovery in tort because the losses related to
the subject matter of the parties' contract).
80. See infra Part III.E.3 (suggesting the economic loss rule is misunderstood and
misapplied in cases where recovery in tort is denied because the same facts arise out of breach
of contract claim).
81. See infra Part III.E.2 (claiming that disappointed expectations should not be
categorically excluded as insufficient grounds for a suit).
82. See infra Part III.D (analogizing traditional notions of preemption to the displacement
of tort law by contract law).
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II. The Policy Basis for the Economic Loss Rule
A. Broad, Speculative, Disproportionate, or Insurable Liability
A variety of reasons have been offered to justify the economic
loss rule,83  although those reasons "have not traditionally been
clear. 84 It is said, for example, that liability for negligence that causes only
83. See generally Gruning, supra note 1, at 206-08 (explaining various policy rationales
advanced in support of the economic loss rule); Vincent R. Johnson, Standardized Tests,
Erroneous Scores, and Tort Liability, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 655, 680-84 (2007) (discussing the
economic loss rule in the context of standardized test mis-scoring litigation).
Three purported justifications for the economic loss rule that are not discussed in the text
concern simplicity, similarity, and social loss. Some writers argue that the economic loss rule
reflects a preference for keeping the cases that fall within the purview of tort law simple. See
Bernstein, supra note 1, at 777 ("Tort law refuses to recognize actions for pure consequential
financial loss because these claims are not easy enough to follow .... To remain intelligible to
prospective plaintiffs, tortfeasor-defendants, and (in the United States) jurors, tort law must
articulate its demands simply, with a relatively low common denominator in mind."). Other
writers argue that pure economic loss is not actionable because, unlike personal injury or
property damage, it is too similar to the types of losses that capitalism takes for granted. See
RESTATEMENT (TIRD) OF TORTS: LtAB. FOR ECON. Loss § 8 cmt. b (Preliminary Draft No. 1,
2005) ("Some believe solely pecuniary harm merits less legal protection than harm to person or
property because pecuniary losses often are not social losses. One firm's lost profit is likely to
be another firm's profit gained."). The social-loss rationale is a theory that seems to have little
impact on the adjudication of real cases. Courts rarely mention this idea in their opinions.
84. Gray, supra note 1, at 898. Addressing the foundational uncertainty surrounding the
various limitations on tort liability for economic loss, Professor Oscar Gray wrote:
Perhaps there is here a flavor of a "standing" issue-a difference sensed between a
complaint about harm to one's own property as compared with harm to another's.
Perhaps, similarly, there is a concern with the possibility of duplicative claims, if
these boundary lines are crossed. Fear of "indeterminate" or "incalculable"
damages is sometimes expressed, for reasons not specified-perhaps concern about
actuarial unmanageability, that is, non-insurability, except at exorbitant premiums,
or subject to unwelcome restrictions, such as deductibility requirements.
These concerns are often coupled with references to the expected "ripple-effects" in
the economic impacts from negligence, where the expected physical effects would
be more limited.
[Another reason is that] ... [a] paradoxical situation can arise where there is a very
large number of potential victims (as in conflagration cases, in the realm of physical
damages) and better risk distribution may be obtained by leaving losses to lie where
they fall than by attempting to concentrate them on an injurer-even if the injurer is
to some extent insured.
Id. at 898-99.
The high-water mark in opaque jurisprudence relating to liability for economic loss may
have been the famous case of Kinsman Transit Co. v. City of Buffalo (Kinsman No. 2), 388 F.2d
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economic harm must be uncompensable under tort law because allowing such
recovery would:
* expose defendants to an unlimited scope of liability; 85
* impose liability for damages that are speculative;
86
821,824-25 (2d Cir. 1968). The plaintiffs were the owners of wheat stored aboard a ship which
could not navigate the river because of the wreckage of a collapsed bridge. Id. at 822. They
brought suit to recover the costs of being forced to transport the wheat via an alternative route.
Id. at 822-23. The court held that even though it was foreseeable that commerce on the river
would be disrupted and that some parties would incur such costs, the relationship of those costs
to the defendants' negligence was "too tenuous and remote" to permit recovery. Id. at 825.
Prosser said that just what this phrase means "would appear to be anybody's guess." See W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 297 (5th ed. 1984). Kinsman No. 2
contains a famous footnote. Writing for the court, Judge Irving Kaufman stated in dicta:
To anyone familiar with N.Y. traffic there can be no doubt that a foreseeable result
of an accident in the Brooklyn Battery Tunnel during rush hour is that thousands of
people will be delayed. A driver who negligently caused such an accident would
certainly be held accountable to those physically injured in the crash. But we doubt
that damages would be recoverable against the negligent driver in favor of truckers
or contract carriers who suffered provable losses because of the delay or to the
wage earner who was forced to 'clock in' an hour late.
Kinsman No. 2., 388 F.2d at 825 n.8.
85. See Aikens v. Balt. & Ohio R. Co., 501 A.2d 277,279 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (rejecting
employees' claim for lost wages caused by plant damage from a train derailment because
permitting recovery "for negligent causation of purely economic loss would be to open the door
to every person in the economic chain of the negligent person or business to bring a cause of
action"); see also David B. Gaebler, Negligence, Economic Loss, and the U. C. C., 61 IND. L.J.
593, 611-12 (1986) (stating that "Professor [Fleming] James noted that as a practical matter the
physical consequences of negligence are usually limited, but that 'the indirect economic
repercussions of negligence may be far wider, indeed virtually open-ended"' (quoting Fleming
James, Limitations on Liability for Economic Loss Caused by Negligence: A Pragmatic
Appraisal, 25 VAND. L. REv. 43, 45 (1972))); Johnson, supra note 32, at 296-97 (asserting that
"somewhat crudely, the economic-loss rule protects potential defendants from the risk of a
disproportionately wide range of liability" (citing JAY M. FEINMAN, ECONOMIC NEGLIGENCE:
LIABILITY OF PROFESSIONALS AND BUSINESSES TO THIRD PARTIES FOR ECONOMIC LOSS §§ 1.2 &
1.3.2 (1995))); Pryor, supra note 1, at 907 (noting that "[t]he economic loss rule rests in part on
considerations that also have insurance implications, such as unpredictability about the extent
and scope of purely economic ripple effects"). See generally Banknorth, N.A. v. BJ's
Wholesale Club, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 2d 206, 213-14 (M.D. Pa. 2006) (rejecting the plaintiff's
arguments related to unlimited liability concerns "because there are many rationales for the
economic loss rule").
Professor Herbert Bernstein suggests that defenders of the economic loss rule erroneously
assume that "widespread liability is a serious concern only in nonphysical harm cases, and that
widespread liability is generally of no concern when negligence has caused personal injury or
physical damage to property." Bernstein, supra note 7, at 127. Under their view, "more than
150 years of rapid industrialization with the attendant phenomenon of mass torts involving
physical injuries of sometimes staggering proportions go virtually unnoticed." Id
86. See Johnson, supra note 32, at 297-98 ("[L]ost economic opportunities are often not
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" result in liability that is disproportionate to fault;8 7 or
* have a "chilling effect on non-negligent conduct.
88
These considerations carry weight, at least under some circumstances.
Yet, whether they justify a general rule denying liability for negligently caused
economic losses unaccompanied by personal injury or property damage is open
to question. It may simply be that liability should be denied whenever damages
are speculative or excessive, or where harm to the plaintiff was insufficiently
foreseeable or was otherwise outside the scope of risks as to make it fair to hold
the defendant liable. Indeed, general principles of damages and proximate
causation already recognize these concepts, and rules are in place to guard
against liability for speculative, 89 excessive,90 or unforeseeable losses9' or losses
outside the scope of risks that made the defendant's conduct negligent.
92
Because that is true, these considerations offer dubious justification for erecting
readily susceptible to precise calculation ... [and by] ruling out litigation in a huge range of
cases (suits involving no personal injury or property damage), the economic-loss rule helps to
ensure (... somewhat crudely) that compensation is not awarded for [speculative] amounts.").
87. See Aikens, 501 A.2d at 279 (stating that "allowance of a cause of action for negligent
interference with economic advantage would create an undue burden upon industrial freedom of
action, and would create a disproportion between the large amount of damages that might be
recovered and the extent of the defendant's fault" (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 766C, cmt. a (1979))); see also Kevin J. Breer & Justin D. Pulikkan, The Economic Loss Rule
in Kansas and Its Impact on Construction Cases, 74 J. KAN. B.A. 30, 31 (June 2005) ("The
primary motivation behind the economic loss rule is the fear that allowing a party to proceed in
tort would result in 'crushing useful activity by a liability.'" (quoting Gunkel v. Renovations
Inc., 797 N.E.2d 841, 844 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003))); London, supra note 52, at 381 (discussing the
risk that liability for economic loss will result in over-deterrence); Rabin, supra note 1, at 862
("[I]t is critical to note that the concern over ripple effects is not synonymous with a crushing
liability concern.").
88. See Gaebler, supra note 85, at 612 (noting that because the line between negligent and
non-negligent conduct is not clearly delineated, the deterrent effect of open-ended liability is
thwarted because it would prevent useful activity as well).
89. See, e.g., Health Call v. Atrium Home & Health Care Servs., Inc., 706 N.W.2d 843,
852 (Mich. App. 2005) ("The general rule is that remote, contingent, and speculative damages
cannot be recovered in Michigan in a tort action.").
90. See, e.g., Johansen v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 170 F.3d 1320, 1328 (1 th Cir. 1999)
(stating that "when a court finds that a jury's award of damages is excessive, it may grant the
defendant a new trial").
91. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 280-81 (5th ed. 1984)
(discussing the general policy of limiting tort liability for unforeseeable consequences of
negligent conduct).
92. Cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LiAB. FOR PHYSiCAL HARM § 29 (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, 2005) ("An actor's liability is limited to those physical harms that result from the
risks that made the actor's conduct tortious.").
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a general economic loss rule. Moreover, while there is a risk that liability for
negligent conduct might have a chilling effect on non-negligent conduct,
"because the line between negligent and non-negligent conduct is not a clear
one,"93 there is no reason to think that that problem is any greater in cases
involving purely economic losses than in the great mass of cases in which
liability for negligence (including economic loss damages) is routinely
imposed.
Courts also sometimes find that liability for negligently caused economic
losses should be denied because those losses were more readily insurable by the
plaintiff than the defendant. 94 This is an important consideration, for the ability
to spread a loss broadly and thereby minimize its costs has been an important
consideration in shaping the American tort rules governing liability.95
However, it is not always the case that a negligently caused economic loss is
more insurable by the plaintiff than the defendant.96 Moreover, the spreading
of losses is only one of many considerations that needs to be taken into account
in determining whether a duty of care should be recognized.97 While the
spreading principle can explain the rulings of courts in particular situations, 98 it
93. Gaebler, supra note 85, at 612.
94. See Castle v. Williams, 788 N.E.2d 421,424 (11. App. Ct. 2003) (denying recovery of
negligently caused economic losses resulting from injury of a key employee in an auto accident
because "employers are in the better position to insure against such a loss through the purchase
of 'key man' insurance and business management").
95. See, e.g., GuiDo CALABREsI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 45, 55-64 (1970) (discussing
the reasons that private insurance gives rise to inadequate loss spreading); Johnson, supra note
83, at 669 n.91 (discussing spreading as it relates to products liability and respondeat superior);
Johnson, supra note 32, at 276 (asserting that, in addressing unsettled questions of duty,
"[c]ourts sometimes.., consider 'the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk
involved,' with the assumption being that insurability of the risk makes imposition of a duty
more palatable because of the cost-spreading ability of insurance" (quoting Rowland v.
Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968))).
96. Cf Pryor, supra note 1, at 918 ("[O]ne is hard-pressed to argue that pure economic
loss is uninsurable. Perhaps the strongest insurability concern would be moral hazard. If the
loss is the failure to live up to the contract's performance obligations, resulting in a diminished
value or quality of service, then the presence of insurance could reduce the insured's incentives
to live up to the contract."). But see London, supra note 52, at 383 (discussing the types of
insurance available for economic loss and arguing that third-party insurance may be
undesirable).
97. Cf Vincent R. Johnson & Claire G. Hargrove, The Tort Duty of Parents to Protect
Minor Children, 51 VILL. L. REv. 311, 329 (2006) ("Whether a device for spreading losses
(such as insurance) is available is only significant if the loss is of the kind that should be spread.
Losses caused by highly blameworthy conduct are not of that variety.").
98. See Edward F. Heimbrock Co. v. Marine Sales & Serv., Inc., 766 S.W.2d 70, 72 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1989) (denying recovery to an employer for economic losses stemming from injuries to
544
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cannot justify a generalized theory denying recovery for negligently caused
pure economic losses in a wide range of cases.
B. Avoiding Losses and Promoting a "Healthy Attitude"
Courts also assert, in contractual contexts, that the "[a]pplication of the
economic loss doctrine to tort actions between commercial parties is...
[intended] to encourage the party best situated to assess the risk of economic
loss, the commercial purchaser, to assume, allocate, or insure against that
risk. " 99 This, too, is an important consideration. "[T]ort law should encourage
individuals to employ available resources to protect their own interests, rather
than depend upon others to save them from harm."'l°° Obviously, the policy has
force with respect to the purchase of goods. However, outside of that arena, it
is difficult to generalize because, in some cases, risks may be more foreseeable
to the person engaging in an injurious activity than to the victim. Thus, one
court held that defendants were "under a duty to commercial fisherman to
conduct their drilling and production in a reasonably prudent manner so as to
avoid the negligent diminution of aquatic life" because the defendants were
"unmistakably... the best cost-avoider.'"'1
Writers sometimes suggest that the economic loss rule promotes a sort of
individual responsibility by encouraging injured persons "to make up the
economic loss by doing more work the next day,"' 02 rather than through
an employee because "employers... are in a better position to insure against loss"); Ferguson v.
Green Island Contracting Corp., 355 N.Y.S.2d 196, 198 (App. Div. 1974) (same).
99. Daanen & Janssen, Inc. v. Cedarapids, Inc., 573 N.W.2d 842, 846 (Wis. 1998); see
also Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951,957 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that the bank
was not liable for the consequences of negligently failing to transfer funds). Judge Posner,
writing for the Seventh Circuit, noted that "the costs of the untoward consequence of a course of
dealings should be borne by that party who was able to avert the consequence at the least cost
and failed to do so." Id. at 757 (citing Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 56 Eng. Rep. 145). Given
this common law standard of liability for consequential damages, the court found that:
It was imprudent thereafter for [the plaintiff], having narrowly avoided cancellation
and having.., been put.., on notice that the payment provision of the Charter
would be strictly enforced thereafter, to wait till arguably the last day before
payment was due to instruct its bank to transfer the necessary funds overseas.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
100. JOHNSON & GuNN, supra note 26, at 9.
101. See Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 570 (9th Cir. 1974) (extensively
discussing the economic theories of Guido Calabresi).
102. London, supra note 52, at 381-82 (quoting Lord Denning in Spartan Steel & Alloys
Ltd. v. Martin & Co., (1973) 1 Q.B. 27, 38).
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litigation. There is merit to this idea, too, at least where the economic loss is
slight. But the "healthy attitude" rationale' 0 3 is hardly the basis on which to
construct a rule that bars recovery for all negligently caused losses, regardless
of how foreseeable or avoidable to the defendant or how damaging to the
plaintiff.
C. The Boundary-Line Function
1. When Contract Principles are Prime
If there is a convincing rationale for the economic loss rule, it is that the
rule performs a critical boundary-line function, separating the law of torts from
the law of contracts.' °4 More specifically, "[t]he underlying purpose of the
economic loss rule is to preserve the distinction between contract and tort
theories in circumstances where both theories could apply." 0 5 This paper will
focus on the meaning and implications of the boundary-line rationale. Further
exploration of the other justifications for the economic loss rule noted above
(relating to overly broad, speculative, disproportionate, or insurable liability or
to who is the best risk avoider or what promotes a "healthy attitude") will be
left to other authors 0 6 or another occasion.
Purely economic losses, authorities urge, are more properly subject to
resolution under contract principles, which defer from private ordering, than by
reference to tort standards. 10 7 Under the logic of private ordering, "individuals
103. See id. at 382 ("The line between 'healthy attitude' that bears the cost of economic
loss and economic loss worthy of compensation is unclear. The economic loss rule takes the
line-drawing function away from the trier of fact and denies any recovery for economic loss.").
104. See Level 3 Commc'ns, LLC v. Liebert Corp., 535 F.3d 1146, 1162 (10th Cir. 2008)
("'Broadly speaking, the economic loss rule is intended to maintain the boundary between
contract law and tort law."' (quoting Town ofAlmav. AZCO Constr., Inc., 10 P.3d 1256, 1259
(Colo. 2000))); Colleton Preparatory Acad., Inc. v. Hoover Universal, Inc., 666 S.E.2d 247,250
(S.C. 2008) ("The purpose of the economic loss rule is to define the line between tort and
contract recovery."); Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 699 N.W.2d 167, 169 (Wis. 2005) ("The
economic loss doctrine is a judicial doctrine intended to preserve the fundamental distinction
between contract and tort.") (citations omitted).
105. Edelstein, supra note 23, at 43; see also Alejandre v. Bull, 153 P.3d 864, 867 (Wash.
2007) ("The economic loss rule applies to hold parties to their contract remedies when a loss
potentially implicates both tort and contract relief.").
106. See Gruning, supra note 1, at 191-206 (discussing nine fact situations, generally not
involving an agreement between the plaintiff and defendant, where compensation is often, but
not always, denied for purely economic loss).
107. See N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 564 A.2d 919, 925
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are the best judges of their own interests; individuals maximize those interests
through contracts; the expectation and reliance interests created by contracts
deserve protection; promoting private contracting produces a social benefit;
contract law provides the framework through which the individual and social
benefits are realized in practice."
10 8
If a person wishes to be protected from economic harm, it is argued, he or
she must bargain for protection and pay the price of securing those benefits. 0 9
One who fails to do so has no right to complain that another has neglected to
exercise care to save him or her from non-physical harm. Put differently, the
economic loss rule performs critical bargain-forcing functions." 0 On one hand,
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (stating that "the law of contract is the proper arena for redressing the
harm because in such a case the damages alleged relate specifically to the product quality and
value as to which the parties have had the opportunity to negotiate and contract in advance");
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 21 cmt. a (1998) ("[P]roducts liability
law lies at the boundary between tort and contract" and some categories of loss, "including those
often referred to as 'pure economic loss,' are more appropriately assigned to contract law and
the remedies set forth in Articles 2 and 2A of the Uniform Commercial Code"); Feinman, supra
note 1, at 814 (asserting that "[iun economic loss cases, private ordering is advanced when
courts recognize contract law as the primary structure for regulating relationships"); JOHNSON &
GUNN, supra note 26, at 738 ("Traditionally, tort covers cases in which the parties cannot be
expected to agree in advance about the rules that will apply."). Johnson and Gunn provide an
example:
[I]t would be absurd to think that motorists and pedestrians could get together in
advance of accidents and agree on who should pay what if someone is hit by a car.
Contract, by contrast, applies to cases in which the parties can and do deal in
advance: if A wants B's house, the way to get it is for A to agree to buy the house
from B, not forA to sue B on the theory that it would be more "reasonable" forA to
own the house than for B to continue to own it .... The law.., leaves questions
of whether a product is "good enough" to the law of contract as a rule, but treats the
issue as a tort issue when personal injury or (some kinds of) property damage
occur.
Id.
108. Feinman, supra note 1, at 814.
109. See Bay State-Spray & Provincetown S.S., Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 533 N.E.2d
1350, 1354-55 (Mass. 1989) ("The commercial user can protect himself by seeking express
contractual assurances concerning the product (and thereby perhaps paying more for the
product) or by obtaining insurance against losses."); cf E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica
Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 872-73 (1986) ("Contract law, and the law of warranty in
particular, is well suited to commercial controversies... [where a defective component of a
product injures only the product itself] because the parties may set the terms of their own
agreements."). The Court noted that by reducing the cost of the product to the consumer, the
"manufacturer can restrict its liability, within limits, by disclaiming warranties or limiting
remedies." Id. at 873.
110. Town of Almav. AZCO Constr., Inc., 10 P.3d 1256, 1262 (Colo. 2000). In Town of
Alma, the court wrote:
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the economic loss rule forces (or at least encourages) the parties to a contract to
think about and bargain over the economic losses that may arise from the
contract."' "There is no requirement that a risk of loss must be expressly
allocated in a contract before a tort claim based on that loss will be precluded
under the economic loss rule."' 1 2 "Courts reason ... that the economic loss
rule applies where the parties could or should have allocated the risk of loss, or
had the opportunity to do so."" 3 On the other hand, the economic loss rule
ensures respect for decisions made by the parties with respect to loss allocation.
"The prohibition against tort actions to recover solely economic damages for
those in contractual privity is designed to prevent parties to a contract from
circumventing the allocation of losses set forth in the contract by bringing an
action for economic loss in tort."' 
14
The boundary-line justification for the economic loss rule is plausible both
in common sense terms and on closer analysis. A person who teaches or
practices tort law would be quite apt to explain that body of legal principles (in
contrast to contract liability) as the law governing compensation for personal
injuries or property damages." 5 While compensation is sometimes afforded by
tort law for economic losses not involving personal injury or property damage,
to state broadly that tort law offers redress for carelessly caused pure economic
Limiting the availability of tort remedies ... [for economic loss related to product
defects] holds parties to the terms of their bargain. In this way, the law serves to
encourage parties to confidently allocate risks and costs during their bargaining
without fear that unanticipated liability may arise in the future, effectively negating
the parties' efforts to build these cost considerations into the contract. The
economic loss rule thus serves to ensure predictability in commercial transactions.
Id.
111. See Alejandre v. Bull, 153 P.3d 864, 868 (Wash. 2007) ("'A bright line distinction
between the remedies offered in contract and tort with respect to economic damages...
encourages parties to negotiate toward the risk distribution that is desired or customary.'"
(quoting Berschauer/Phillips Constr. Co. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 881 P.2d 986, 992
(1994))).
112. Id. at866.
113. Id. at 870. Following the legal precedents of other jurisdictions, the court held that
"the economic loss rule applies regardless of whether the specific risk of loss at issue was
expressly allocated in the parties' contract." Id. at 871.
114. Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Am. Aviation, Inc., 891 So. 2d 532, 536 (Fla. 2004).
"Underlying this rule is the assumption that the parties to a contract have allocated the economic
risks of nonperformance through the bargaining process." Id.
115. See, e.g., JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 26, at 3 ("In general, tort law is a vehicle of
legal redress for victims of physical injury or damage to tangible property. It also, on occasion,
provides compensation or other relief for such diverse forms of harm as mental distress,
impairment of reputation, and non-tangible economic injuries.").
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losses would be both imprecise and over-inclusive. In addition, while there are
certainly cases when tort law and contract law can and should offer
overlapping, alternative remedies,' 16 there must be a point at which tort law
leaves off and only contract law governs. Otherwise "contract law would
drown in a sea of tort,"'"17 since tort law frequently offers potential plaintiffs
more generous terms of recovery. 118 There would indeed be no sensible
stopping point if a party to a contract could recover under tort principles merely
because the other party failed to exercise care to avoid causing the first party
losses of a purely economic nature.
2. Product-Related Economic Losses
The boundary-line function of the economic loss rule is most clearly
established in the field of products liability." 9 If a defective product causes
physical harm to a person or to property other than the product itself, a tort
action may be brought. 20 In contrast, if the loss is solely of an economic
116. See Johnson, supra note 83, at 679 ("In many areas of the law, such as products
liability, a plaintiff has the option of asserting a breach-of-contract claim, or tort claims based on
negligence or strict liability, or all of those theories. Similarly, a client harmed by the conduct
of a lawyer, ordinarily may sue for breach of contract, as well as on a tort theory, such as
professional negligence, fraud, or breach of fiduciary duty.").
117. E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866 (1986).
118. See Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 699 N.W.2d 167, 171 (Wis. 2005). ("Tort law
generally offers a 'broader array' of damages than contract."). The Grams court explained:
For example, punitive damages and attorney fees are sometimes available in tort
actions, but generally cannot be had in breach of contract claims. Contracts give
the parties an opportunity to limit the scope and amount of liability. Further, the
nature of a claim, tort or contract, may affect whether a particular person or entity is
eligible as a defendant and whether a particular claim is covered by insurance.
Id. at 171 n.4; see also Alejandre v. Bull, 153 P.3d 864, 874 (Wash. 2007) (Chambers, J.,
concurring) ("Tort remedies are often, perhaps always, significantly larger than contract
remedies.").
119. Cf. Banknorth, N.A. v. BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 2d 206, 211 (M.D.
Pa. 2006) (noting that the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine had "addressed the economic loss
rule in only one context, a products liability claim"). See generally Gaebler, supra note 85, at
594 ("[M]ost courts refuse to recognize a cause of action in negligence for purely economic
losses in products liability cases."); Gennady A. Gorel, Note, The Economic Loss Doctrine:
Arguingfor the Intermediate Rule and Taming the Tort-Eating Monster, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 517,
550 (2006) (criticizing majority rule on grounds that it fails to incentivize safer product
manufacturing procedures, and proposing an intermediate rule which would afford courts
greater discretion to review similar causes of actions on a case-by-case basis).
120. See Murray v. Ford Motor Co., 97 S.W.3d 888, 893 (Tex. App. 2003) (holding, in a
tort action involving a truck that caught fire, that the plaintiff could recover $453.25 for
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nature, such as when a product defect injures the product itself1 2 1 or impairs the
product's value, 22 the plaintiff ordinarily is relegated to compensation under
contract principles.123 Illustratively, if a person buys a can of paint and applies
damages to other property, but nothing for the loss of the truck).
121. See Colleton Preparatory Acad., Inc. v. Hoover Universal, Inc., 666 S.E.2d 247,250
(S.C. 2008) ("The economic loss rule generally provides there is no tort liability for a defective
product if the product damages only itself."); see also Turbomeca, S.A. v. French Aircraft
Agency, Inc., 913 So. 2d 714, 716-17 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that the rule barred a
helicopter owner from recovering from engine manufacturer on a negligence theory for the loss
of the helicopter in a crash); Progressive Ins. Co. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 749 N.E.2d 484, 486-
88 (Ind. 2001) (holding that an automobile, which caught fire as a result of allegedly defective
wiring, was to be viewed as a single unit and that therefore there was no damage to "other
property" that would support a products liability claim); Bocre Leasing Corp. v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 645 N.E.2d 1195, 1197-98 (N.Y. 1995) (holding that buyer of a used helicopter could
not recover in tort from engine manufacturer for losses caused by a defect in the engine which
resulted only in damage to the helicopter).
Numerous cases discuss the distinction between "the product itself' and "other property."
See, e.g., Jimenez v. Super. Ct., 58 P.3d 450, 457-58 (Cal. 2002) (discussing the process of
determining which product is at issue and holding that economic loss rule did not bar a
homeowner's recovery in tort for damage that a defective window caused to other parts of the
home in which it was installed); Foremost Farms USA Coop. v. Performance Process, Inc., 726
N.W.2d 289,294-95 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006) (discussing "integrated system" test: "[O]nce apart
becomes integrated into a completed product or system, the entire product or system ceases to
be 'other property' for purposes of the economic loss doctrine." (quoting Selzer v. Brunsell
Bros., 652 N.W.2d 806, 818 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002))). See generally Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M.
Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 875, 884-85 (1997) (holding that equipment added to a boat was not
part of the product itself and, therefore, the economic loss rule did not bar recovery); Reyton
Cedar Knoll, LLC v. HPG Int'l, Inc., No. 07-2955, 2008 WL 3823922, at *2 (3d Cir. Aug. 18,
2008) (treating an entire shopping mall as a "product"); Int'l Flavors & Fragrances, Inc. v.
McCormick & Co., No. 06-2655, 2008 WL 4183907, at *9 (D.N.J. Sept. 12, 2008) (holding that
defective paprika incorporated into barbeque seasoning injured only the product itself);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 21 cmt. a (1998) (discussing liability for harm
to the defective product itself).
122. See Vigilant Ins. Co. v. SPX Corp., No. 06-23, 2008 WL 723318, at *2 (W.D. Pa.
Mar. 14, 2008) (holding that the economic loss rule barred a subrogation claim based on
negligence and strict liability seeking damages for cost of replacing defective television
antenna); cf. Ziegelmann v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 649 N.W.2d 556, 561 (N.D. 2002)
(rejecting a claim by group of vehicle owners seeking damages resulting from automaker's
failure to equip vehicles with parking brake interlock on the grounds that the resulting economic
harm in the form of loss of resale value was too speculative to be actionable).
123. Some courts have ruled that the economic loss rule does not bar recovery of purely
economic damages if the defendant's conduct posed a serious risk of personal injury or property
damage, even if that risk did not come to fruition. See Colleton Preparatory Acad., Inc. v.
Hoover Universal, Inc, 666 S.E.2d 247, 249 (S.C. 2008) (involving a defective roof truss system
that had to be replaced for safety reasons); see also Palmeri v. LG Elecs. USA, Inc., No. 07-
5706 2008 WL 2945985, at *5 (D.N.J. July 30, 2008) (recognizing the serious risk of harm
exception to the economic loss doctrine).
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the paint to a door, the person has a potential tort claim (and perhaps a contract
claim as well based on breach of warranty) if toxic odors from the paint make
the plaintiff sick or if the paint eats away at the door and damages that "other"
property. However, if the paint simply fails to adhere to the door effectively
and flakes off, or quickly discolors, causing no other damage but making the
paint's purchase a waste of money, the buyer's sole avenue for recovery is
rooted in contract principles.
124
The economic loss rule operates sensibly in the products liability field
because the commercial nature of the underlying transaction means that a
contract-law remedy is not only feasible, but routinely available. The sale that
produces the distribution of the defective product allows the parties to
determine how economic risks relating to the quality of the product should be
allocated and supplies default rules relating to warranties that resolve disputes
if the parties do not specify particular terms of recovery. 125 In addition, the
ubiquitous adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) means that there
is a carefully crafted statutory mechanism available for resolving economic loss
claims. Various courts have found the applicability of the UCC to be pivotal.
126
In explaining its decision not to apply the economic loss rule to service
contracts, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin wrote:
Central to our decision was the fact that no body of law similar to the UCC
applies to contracts for services .... [T]he UCC provides a
"comprehensive system for compensating consumers for economic loss
arising from the purchase of defective products .... "
124. See VINCENT R. JoHNsoN & ALAN GUNN, TEACHING ToRTS 269 (3d ed. 2005) (stating
a hypothetical based on these facts).
125. Cf Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 875, 880 (1997). The
Court stated:
The commercial buyer and commercial seller can negotiate a contract-a
warranty-that will set the terms of compensation for product failure. If the buyer
obtains a warranty, he will receive compensation for the product's loss, whether the
product explodes or just refuses to start. If the buyer does not obtain a warranty, he
will likely receive a lower price in return. Given the availability of warranties, the
courts should not ask tort law to perform a job that contract law might perform
better.
Id.
126. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Corp. v. BASF Corp., No. 06-283, 2008 WL 4185870, at *16
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2008) ("The New Jersey Supreme Court grounded the economic loss doctrine
in a number of policy concerns, including maintaining the Uniform Commercial Code ... as a
'comprehensive statutory scheme."') (citing Spring Motors Distribs. Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 98
N.J. 555, 557 (1985)).
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Concern about duplicating or overriding UCC provisions was an
important reason this court chose to adopt the economic loss doctrine in the
first place .... 127
The abundance of products available in the American market theoretically
makes it possible for buyers to bargain for the level of economic loss protection
they desire. Referring again to the previous example, a consumer can elect to
purchase cheap paint or expensive paint or something in between. It is neither
surprising nor unfair if "you get what you pay for."
As explained by then-Chief Justice Benjamin K. Miller of the Supreme
Court of Illinois:
The [economic loss] doctrine reflects the principle that there are varying
degrees of quality, all commercially acceptable, that parties to a
commercial transaction are free to bargain over if they choose ....
Disputes later arising from the character of the materials used should be
determined under principles of contract law, and should be controlled by
the requirements imposed by the parties' own undertaking. In that instance,
the contract itself serves best to define the parties' respective rights and
obligations. 128
Nevertheless, important principles limit the scope of the economic loss
rule in reference to its boundary-line function. In some situations, the
plaintiff never assented to the terms of the contract that the defendant
asserts is the exclusive measure of duty. The question then is whether the
plaintiff's rights should be limited by the terms of such an agreement. In
other cases, no contract with a third person other than the defendant was
ever entered into by the plaintiff to mitigate or eliminate the risk of
economic loss, but theoretically there could have been a contract. The
issue is whether the pre-loss availability of that hypothetical remedy bars
recovery in tort. Finally, in other situations, the parties to a contract are
subject to independent duties under tort law, but difficult questions arise as
to whether the terms of a contract, or contractual silence, override those
otherwise enforceable obligations. These matters are discussed below.
127. Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 699 N.W.2d 167, 171-72 (Wis. 2005) (citations omitted).
128. Collins v. Reynard, 607 N.E.2d 1185, 1188 (Ill. 1992) (Miller, C.J., specially
concurring).
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III. Limits on the Boundary-Line Function of the Economic Loss Rule
A. Claims by Persons Not in Privity
1. Contract Law as the Exclusive Source of Duty
A number of courts have rejected arguments that contract principles define
the extent of the duty where the economic injurer and victim were not in
privity.'2 9 For example, in Russo v. NCS Pearson, Inc. ,13 students who took
the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) sued a national testing service for economic
losses caused by the negligent scoring and misreporting of SAT results.13 ' The
testing service, which was under contract with the College Board, but not with
the individual test takers, argued that the plaintiffs' claims were not actionable
in tort because they were based on the testing service's misperformance of
contractual obligations. 32  The Federal District Court for the District of
Minnesota rejected that defense and found that the plaintiffs stated a claim
for negligence. 133 The opinion explained "it strikes the Court as unfair to
129. See Indem. Ins. Co. ofN. Am. v. Am. Aviation, Inc., 891 So. 2d 532, 534 (Fla. 2004)
("[The] 'economic loss rule' bars a negligence action to recover solely economic damages only
in circumstances where the parties are either in contractual privity or the defendant is a
manufacturer or distributor of a product, and no established exception to the application of the
rule applies."); see also S. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. v. Banko, No. 8:06CV840T27EAJ, 2006
WL 2935281, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 13, 2006) (holding the rule did not bar a suit by a mother
against an insurance company for negligently failing to provide her son with information
relevant to changing his beneficiary designation, thereby causing the mother to be excluded as a
beneficiary after her son filed the form with defendant's local agent rather than home office);
Advisor's Capital Invs., Inc. v. Cumberland Cas. & Sur. Co., No. 8:05-cv-404-T-23MAP, 2006
WL 1428490, at *3 (M.D. Fla. May 22, 2006) (holding that when parties were not in contractual
privity, otherwise viable tort claims were not barred by the economic loss rule); Output, Inc. v.
Danka Bus. Sys., Inc., No. 4D07-2008, 2008 WL 4057754, at *3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 3,
2008) (holding that a fraud claim related to contractual performance was not barred by the
economic loss rule because plaintiff was not a party); Biscayne Inv. Group, Ltd. v. Guarantee
Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 903 So. 2d 251,255 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that the economic
loss rule did not bar negligence action by a condominium developer against management
company with which it was not in privity).
130. See Russo v. NCS Pearson, Inc., 462 F. Supp. 2d 981,986 (D. Minn. 2006) (denying
plaintiff-students' motion for temporary injunction requesting re-reporting of certain students'
SAT score results).
131. Id. at986-87.
132. Id. at 994 ("The College Board responds that.., a plaintiff is not entitled to recover
tort damages save for exceptional cases in which a breach of contract 'constitutes or is
accompanied by an independent tort."' (quoting Wild v. Rarig, 234 N.W.2d 775, 789-90 (Minn.
1975))).
133. Id. at 995.
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hold ... , as a matter of law, that Plaintiffs lack a tort remedy because the
alleged tort arose in the context of the performance of a contract to which they
were strangers."1 34 The court was not persuaded that defendant's contract with
a third party defined the full extent of its obligations.,
35
Similarly, in A. C. Excavating v. Yacht Club II Homeowners Ass 'n, 13 6 the
Supreme Court of Colorado held that although "subcontractors [had] assumed
contractual obligations with the developer and general contractor, these
obligations did not and could not relieve the subcontractors of their
independent duty [under state court decisions] to act without negligence in
constructing the development."' 37 Consequently, the economic loss rule did not
bar a negligence action by a homeowners association against the subcontractors
seeking recovery for economic losses. 138
Recognizing third-party rights under tort law in these types of cases does
not undermine the public policy in favor of private ordering. Rather, it merely
recognizes that private ordering takes place not in a vacuum, but within a
context of other obligations.139 When the issue of whether economic losses are
compensable relates to third-party protection, the intent of the parties is not the
only relevant consideration:
134. Id. at 1001. The test takers also sued the College Board, with whom they were in
privity of contract, alleging numerous causes of action, including breach of contract, negligence,
defamation, and statutory claims. Id. at 988-89. The College Board argued that the negligence
claim was barred by the Minnesota version of the economic loss rule. Id. at 994. The court
determined that it would be premature to dismiss the test takers' negligence claim because it was
uncertain whether an exception applied. Id. at 995-96. Ultimately, the claims against the
College Board settled. See SATAdministrators Settle Lawsuit for $3 Million, ALBANY UNION
TIMES, Aug. 26, 2007, 2007 WLNR 16662300. See generally Johnson, supra note 83, at 680-
84 (explaining why the economic loss rule should not bar recovery of purely economic losses in
cases involving harm caused by erroneous scoring of standardized tests).
135. Id. at 1000-01.
136. See A.C. Excavating v. Yacht Club II Homeowners Ass'n, 114 P.3d 862, 870 (Colo.
2005) (addressing a case in which a homeowners association brought suit in negligence against
entities involved in construction of housing development).
137. Id.
138. See id. ("[W]e find that the independent duty [of the subcontractors] exists and places
this case beyond the scope of the economic loss rule.").
139. Cf Jesse Howard Witt, The Spearin Doctrine and the Economic Loss Rule in
Residential Construction, 35 CoLo. LAW. 49, 57 (July 2006) ("[lIt is ... important to consider
the limits of... negotiations [between the parties to a construction contract] when the ultimate
harm may fall on parties outside the commercial setting. Contractors should not bid on any
project in a vacuum, and the cost of protecting consumers from poor designs and substandard
work cannot be ignored.").
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Fundamental tort policies are implicated as well: compensating victims of
harm; deterring wrongful conduct and providing incentives for reasonable
conduct; placing losses on those who can best bear or distribute them; and
fairness ... [in] redressing harm caused to innocent parties and imposing
the burden of harm on the parties responsible for it.
1
40
With respect to the boundary-line function of the economic loss rule,
decisions holding that third-party claims are not foreclosed by the rule make
sense. If there is no agreement between the parties to a lawsuit, there is no risk
that recognizing tort obligations will violate the parties' freedom to contract,
141
because there never was an effort to exercise such freedom. If the parties are
not in privity, contract law does not potentially afford a remedy, except in the
relatively rare case of a third-party beneficiary. 142 Thus, respect for contract
principles and private ordering does not require that the economic loss rule bar
the claims of persons not standing in a contractual relationship. The purpose of
the economic loss rule is not to leave injured persons remediless for economic
losses but to ensure respect for private ordering by relegating a plaintiff to
contract remedies in cases where there is an agreement between the parties
allocating economic risks. 143 If there is no contract between the parties to
litigation, there is no boundary-line function to be performed by the economic
loss rule.
The reason that a third person physically injured by a defective product is
permitted to sue in tort for resulting damages is that such a person "generally
had neither the bargaining power nor the opportunity to bargain with its
manufacturer or seller and so could not reasonably provide himself with the
140. Feinman, supra note 1, at 821.
141. See Daanen & Janssen, Inc. v. Cedarapids, Inc., 573 N.W.2d 842, 846 (Wis. 1998)
("Application of the economic loss doctrine to tort actions between commercial parties is...
[intended] to protect commercial parties' freedom to allocate economic risk by contract.").
142. See, e.g., Weathers Auto Glass, Inc. v. Alfa Mut. Ins. Co., 619 So. 2d 1328, 1329
(Ala. 1993) ("A party claiming to be a third-party beneficiary of a contract must establish that
the contracting parties intended, upon execution of the contract, to bestow a direct, as opposed
to an incidental, benefit upon the third party."); Pelham v. Griesheimer, 440 N.E.2d 96,98 (111.
1982) (stating that a breach of contract claim may be brought under a third-party beneficiary
theory of recovery if the contract was entered into for the "direct benefit" of the plaintiffs).
143. In Miller v. U.S. Steel Corp., 902 F.2d 573, 575-76(7th Cir. 1990), which held that
the economic loss rule barred a claim for product related economic damages, the court seemed
to find it significant that there was a contract between the parties and there "was no gap in
liability-no danger that the... [plaintiffs] would fall between the stools of tort and contract."
Id. at 575. But see Banknorth, N.A. v. BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 2d 206, 213
(M.D. Pa. 2006) (rejecting the plaintiff's argument that "Maine law bars a negligence claim only
when the party has an alternative warranty or contract claim" because the plaintiff cited "no
authority for this proposition").
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same kind of protection that a purchaser of goods could."' 44  Similarly,
nonparties to a contract typically have no real opportunity (and often little
power 145) to bargain over protection from economic losses caused by negligent
performance of the agreement. Nonparties therefore should not be precluded
from suing in tort for resulting damages.
As noted above, a third-party beneficiary may have enforceable rights
under contract law, even though not a party to the agreement. Does that mean
that a tort claim by this category of plaintiff against a party to the contract
should be barred by the economic loss rule? Presumably, the answer is no. It
is one thing to defer to private ordering when the question concerns the rights
of parties to an agreement. It is something else entirely to say that two parties
to an agreement may limit the rights of third parties (even third-party
beneficiaries) who never participated in the negotiation of the contract. If
established tort principles entitle a third party to protection under tort law for
economic loss, an agreement to which the third party never assented should not
be permitted to vitiate his or her right to tort remedies.
2. Recovery by Purchasers Against Defendants Not in Privity
Occasionally, courts have held that the economic loss rule bars a tort claim
related to a contract even where the parties to the lawsuit are not in privity.1
46
These decisions can sometimes be explained as a natural application of the
economic loss rule in the context of a sale of goods, as where a disappointed
purchaser of a product sues the manufacturer or wholesaler of the goods (rather
than the retailer). 147 A purchaser seeking purely economic losses should not be
permitted to complain, under tort principles, against anyone in the chain of
distribution that the product the plaintiff bought was not better (i.e., more
effective, more valuable, or more "reasonable") than what the plaintiff
144. Bay State-Spray & Provincetown S.S., Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 533 N.E.2d
1350, 1355 (Mass. 1989).
145. See infra Part III.F (discussing lack of bargaining power).
146. See Pa. State Employees Credit Union v. Fifth Third Bank, 398 F. Supp. 2d 317,329
(M.D. Pa. 2005) (rejecting the plaintiffs argument that a negligence claim for economic losses
is barred only when the parties are in privity of contract); Plourde Sand & Gravel Co. v. JGI E.,
Inc., 917 A.2d 1250, 1254 (N.H. 2007) (same).
147. See Daanen & Janssen, Inc. v. Cedarapids, Inc., 573 N.W.2d 842, 852 (Wis. 1998)
(holding that the economic loss rule barred recovery in tort from a manufacturer, "even in the
absence of privity").
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bargained for under the law of contract. 148 Absent fraud14 9 or some other
breach of an independent duty, 150 contract principles normally are the buyer's
sole remedy for purely economic loss related to purchased goods, regardless of
whether the suit is against the retailer, with whom the purchaser was in privity,
or against a wholesaler or manufacturer up the chain of distribution.' 5' In this
type of case, it is the defendant (the manufacturer or wholesaler), rather than
the plaintiff (the purchaser), who is the stranger to the final contract of sale.
With respect to purely economic loss, it is ordinarily fair to bind the plaintiff by
the terms of the agreement to which the plaintiff assented.
3. Tort Duty Related to Performance of a Contract with Another
Questions arise as to whether a potential defendant's negligent
performance of a contractual obligation owed to the third party can also be a
breach of a tort duty to a person not in privity (the potential plaintiff).' 52 Some
cases answer this question in the negative'5 3 and inappropriately invoke the
economic loss rule as a reason for denying recovery. One such case is Plourde
Sand & Gravel Co. v. JGI Eastern, Inc.154  This decision is difficult to
understand from the perspective of the boundary-line function of the economic
loss rule.
In Plourde Sand & Gravel, Hiltz, a subcontractor for a private
construction project in the Town of Pembroke, hired the plaintiff to supply
148. See id. at 848 ("'[P]arties factor risk allocation into their agreements and... the
absence of comprehensive warranties is reflected in the price paid. Permitting parties to sue in
tort when the deal goes awry rewrites the agreement by allowing a party to recoup a benefit that
was not part of the bargain."' (quoting Stoughton Trailers, Inc. v. Henkel Corp., 965 F. Supp.
1227, 1230 (W.D. Wis. 1997))).
149. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing fraud).
150. See infra Part III.C. 1 (discussing independent duties under tort law).
151. Id.
152. In Part III.A. 1, see the discussion ofRusso v. NCS Pearson, Inc., 111 F. Supp. 2d 981
(D. Minn. 2006) and A.C. Excavating v. Yacht Club IIHomeownersAss'n, 114 P.3d 862 (Colo.
2005).
153. See Gaebler, supra note 85, at 601 ("Courts have also refused to impose tort liability
in cases in which the defendant negligently failed to perform some obligation (usually contract)
owed to one party and this failure in turn caused economic injury to the plaintiff.").
154. See Plourde Sand & Gravel Co. v. JGI E., Inc., 917 A.2d 1250, 1254 (N.H. 2007)
(holding that plaintiff's claim for economic damages was barred by the economic loss rule
despite a lack of privity with defendant).
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gravel for the purpose of constructing a roadway. 155 Engineers employed by the
town hired the defendant to test the gravel to determine whether it met the
town's specifications. 156  The defendant erroneously determined that the
plaintiff s gravel was inadequate and the plaintiff therefore was forced to incur
the costs of removing and replacing the gravel. 57 The Supreme Court of New
Hampshire held that because the plaintiffs negligence claim against the
defendant sought only economic damages, it was barred by the economic loss
rule, regardless of the fact that there was no contract between the plaintiff and
defendant that could have dictated the terms of a contractual remedy.'58
It is hard to understand the basis for the court's decision. The court's
rationale was as follows:
The policy behind ... [the economic loss rule] is to prevent potentially
limitless liability for economic losses ....
Moreover, permitting economic loss recovery in tort here would blur the
distinction between contract and tort law. The plaintiff is essentially
alleging that the defendant negligently performed its duties under its
contract with another party and that as a result, the plaintiff has lost the
benefit of its bargain with Hiltz ....
.... The economic loss the plaintiff suffered in removing and replacing
the gravel arose "solely from disappointed commercial expectations" in that
the plaintiff "lost the anticipated profits of its contract" with Hiltz ....
Imposing a tort duty upon the defendant in this case would disrupt the
contractual relationships between and among the various parties.
59
The court's reasoning is questionable on several grounds. First, this was
not a case of"potentially limitless liability.' 160 It seems entirely clear from the
155. Id at 1252.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1254.
159. Id. at 1254-57.
160. See id. at 1254 ("Many courts... have expanded the economic loss doctrine to bar
economic recovery in tort cases where there is no contract and thus no privity. The policy
behind this principle is to prevent potentially limitless liability for economic losses ......
(citations omitted).
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facts that if the testing of the gravel was negligently deficient, it would affect
the provider of the gravel, not some vast class of potential plaintiffs, and that
the economic losses would extend only as far as the cost of the materials
involved in the job, and no further.161 Moreover, allowing a negligence claim
would not "disrupt the contractual relationships between and among the various
parties"'162 because the only duty that negligence law would impose on the
defendant would be to exercise care in testing the gravel. That duty would
have been entirely consistent with the obligations that the defendant had
already obliged itself to perform pursuant to its contract with the engineers.
This is not the case of whether the court should recognize an inconsistent,
competing obligation that might interfere with contractual performance.
More importantly, for purposes relating to the boundary-line function of
the economic loss rule, allowing the plaintiff in Plourde Sand & Gravel to sue
for negligence would not "blur the distinction between contract and tort law." 
63
Contractual performance always takes place within a matrix of other legal
obligations, including those imposed by the law of torts. For example, it is no
defense to a tort claim alleging negligent misrepresentation causing economic
loss that, at the time of the erroneous statement, the defendant was acting
pursuant to a contractual relationship between the defendant and some other
person. 164 Parties to contracts have obligations beyond those imposed by the
terms of their agreements.
To be sure, in cases like Plourde Sand & Gravel, there is a valid question
concerning whether performance (or misperformance) of a contractual
161. The issue in Plourde Sand & Gravel is not unlike the one raised in Glanzer v.
Shepard, 135 N.E. 275,275-76 (N.Y. 1922) (Cardozo, J.), which dealt with the compensability
of economic losses that arose in the context of a negligent representation made in the course of
contractual performance. Id. at 275. Glanzer involved a public weigher who had negligently
overstated the weight of a shipment of beans, to the detriment of the purchaser. Id. The court
held that because the defendant knew that the plaintiff would rely on the certificate of weight in
paying the seller who had arranged for the weighing, and had in fact sent a copy of the
certificate to the plaintiff, there should be liability. Id. at 275-76. The purchase bythe plaintiff
was the "end and aim" of the transaction. Id. at 277. In Plourde Sand & Gravel, the plaintiff
argued that the negligent misrepresentation exception to the economic loss rule applied.
Plourde Sand & Gravel Co. v. JGI E., Inc., 917 A.2d 1250, 1254 (N.H. 2007). The court
rejected that argument, finding that the information was communicated to the plaintiff only
indirectly and plaintiff did not claim that "it relied upon the report." Id. at 1258 (emphasis in
original).
162. Id. at 1257.
163. Id. at 1256.
164. See, e.g., Trust Co. of La. v. N.N.P. Inc., 104 F.3d 1478, 1488 (5th Cir. 1997)
(holding an attorney liable to non-clients for negligently misrepresenting the enforceability of a
settlement agreement).
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obligation owed to one person creates a tort duty of care to a third person who
foreseeably may be injured. 65 This type of question is not uncommon in tort
law. Cases often present the issue of whether a person performing a contractual
duty owed to one person has a duty to act to prevent physical harm to a third
person. Courts have held, for example, that mental health professionals who
learn in the course of a therapeutic relationship that a patient poses a threat of
physical harm to a third person have a duty to exercise reasonable care to
prevent that harm from occurring. 66 Similarly, physicians have been found to
have a duty to warn third persons that a patient has a communicable disease
167
or to inform the subject of a physical exam conducted pursuant to a contract
with an employer of a diseased condition detected during the examination. 68
Other cases raise the question of whether a person performing a
contractual obligation owed to one person has an additional tort duty to
another person to exercise reasonable care to prevent harm to the third
person's economic interests.1 69  The drug testing cases offer a good
illustration. If a testing service hired by an employer negligently performs a
drug test on an employee or job applicant, the affected test subject may be
165. See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. SEC Donohue, Inc., 679 N.E.2d 1197, 1200-02 (I11.
1997) (holding that the economic loss rule barred the subrogee of a subcontractor from recovery
in tort against an engineering firm for the costs of repair work to an underground water system
that were allegedly caused by the subcontractor's reliance on negligently prepared engineering
plans for the system); Anderson Elec., Inc. v. Ledbetter Erection Corp., 503 N.E.2d 246, 249
(Ill. 1987) (denying recovery from both a contractor and subcontractor for the costs of redoing
work because those costs "were purely economic losses" which "arose solely from disappointed
commercial expectations").
166. See, e.g., Tarasoffv. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 347 (Cal. 1976) (stating
that the exercise of reasonable care to protect the threatened victim requires the therapist to warn
the endangered party or those who can reasonably be expected to notify him and that there is
"no sufficient societal interest that would protect and justify concealment"); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYsICAL HARM § 41 reporter's note to cmt. g
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) ("A substantial number of courts, and legislatures enacting
statutes, limit the duty to warning the potential victim.").
167. See Vincent R. Johnson & Brian T. Bagley, Fighting Epidemics with Information and
Laws: The Case of SARS in China, 24 PENN ST. INT'L. L. REv. 157, 170 n.97 (2005) (collecting
cases pro and con).
168. See Webb v. T.D., D.C., 951 P.2d 1008, 1014 (Mont. 1997) (holding that a physician
who independently examined a worker at the request of her employer's workers' compensation
carrier owed a duty to the worker to exercise ordinary care to discover conditions posing
imminent danger to the worker's physical or mental well-being and to take reasonable steps to
communicate the conditions to the worker).
169. Cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51(4) (2000)
(recognizing that lawyers who represent fiduciaries often have duties to prevent economic harm
to the nonclients to whom the fiduciaries have obligations).
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fired or rejected for employment, and in either case will suffer economic
losses. A number of courts, influenced perhaps by the reduced risk of
indeterminate liability 70 or the fact that the parties to the contract could
allocate losses relating to inadvertent errors, 7 permit the test subject to sue
the testing agency for negligence, even though there was no contract between
the parties and only economic losses resulted. 72 A minority of courts are to
the contrary. 173 The point here is that it is appropriate for courts to consider
these types of duty questions within the context of tort jurisprudence.
74
Depending on the facts and the interests at stake, some duty claims will be
found to be meritorious and others will not. Blindly applying the economic
loss rule to bar all third-party claims related to contractual performance
precludes courts from undertaking a thoughtful assessment of whether a
170. See Amy Newman & Jay M. Feinman, Liability of a Laboratory for Negligent
Employment or Pre-Employment Drug Testing, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 473,484 (1999) (stating that
"[t]he imposition of liability arises only in relationships where the number of parties is fixed"
and that the "laboratory's potential liability will extend no farther than the number of samples it
contracts to test").
171. See Rabin, supra note 1, at 868. Professor Rabin explains:
[T]he critical point is that in fact the case for making promotion of private ordering
a salient consideration in the negligent drug-testing cases cuts.., in favor of
recognizing the tort obligation of the service provider. It is the service provider and
the employer-those in contractual privity-who can take account of the risk of
inadvertent error in conducting the testing and provide for loss allocation in
negotiation of the service agreement.
Id.
172. See Wilson v. Compass Vision Inc., No. C07-3431 BZ, 2007 WL 4570613, at *1
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 27, 2007) (finding that defendants who performed drug testing on the plaintiff
at the request of the Board of Registered Nurses owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, who was
discharged followed the reporting of false positive results); Sharpe v. St. Luke's Hosp., 821
A.2d 1215, 1220-21 (Pa. 2003) (holding that a hospital, under contract with the plaintiffis
employer to perform drug testing, owed the plaintiff a duty of reasonable care and could be
liable for economic losses resulting from termination); Duncan v. Afton, Inc., 991 P.2d 739,
744-46 (Wyo. 1999) (holding that, based on policy considerations relating to deterrence and
other factors, a collection company hired by employer owed a duty of care to the employee
when handling urine specimens that ultimately led to the employee's termination); see also
Merrick v. Thomas, 522 NW.2d 402, 406-07 (Neb. 1994) (holding that a merit commission
owed a duty not only to the sheriff, but also to the plaintiff job applicant, to score a test
accurately).
173. See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Doe, 903 S.W.2d 347, 352-54 (Tex. 1995)
(holding that a laboratory, under contract with an employer to perform applicants' drug tests,
had no duty to a prospective employee to enquire into matters that could trigger false positive
results).
174. See Gray, supra note 1, at 900-02 (suggesting that courts should remain free to
recognize cases where liability for economic loss is appropriate).
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tort duty should be recognized and how far liability should extend.
Moreover, it does so without justification. Under principles of private
ordering, parties to a contract may allocate risks among themselves, but
they have no right to strip third parties of whatever protection tort law
provides for valuable personal interests, including interests related to
purely economic harm.
B. Hypothetical Remedies Under Nonexistent Contracts
Cases purporting to apply the economic loss rule for boundary-line
reasons sometimes seize upon the fact that the plaintiff could have
contracted with a third person to address the risk that gave rise to economic
loss as a reason for denying recovery in tort. 175 Thus, some courts hold that
a hypothetical contract remedy makes relief in tort unavailable. 176 From the
standpoint of the boundary-line rationale, applying the economic loss rule
in this manner is seriously questionable.
In Banknorth, N.A. v. BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc., 177 a merchant failed
to protect the personal information of Visa cardholders. 178 The data was
then hacked by a third party and misused in unauthorized transactions.' 79 The
foreseeable result of the merchant's negligence was that a card issuer (a bank
with whom the merchant had no contract) incurred huge economic losses
related to reissuing cards and reimbursing cardholders for fraudulent charges,
as the bank was required to do by its agreement with Visa.' 80 The Federal
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania held that the negligent
merchant bore no liability for the bank's losses because the economic loss rule
barred the claim. 81 The court did not find that contract principles, rather than
175. Id.
176. See Foremost Farms USA Coop. v. Performance Process, Inc., 726 N.W.2d 289,297
n.8 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006) ("Some economic loss doctrine cases seemingly suggest that the
contract bargaining contemplated when addressing the 'disappointed expectations' test need be
only hypothetical.").
177. See Banknorth, N.A. v. BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 2d 206, 213-14
(M.D. Pa. 2006) (holding that the economic loss rule barred a claim by issuing bank against a
merchant that allowed cardholder information to be hacked, despite lack of privity between the
parties).
178. Id. at 207.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 209.
181. Id. at208.
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tort law, governed the liability of the merchant to the plaintiff.182 There was no
contract between the plaintiff issuing bank and the defendant merchant.
183
Rather, the court's ruling was based on the fact that the bank "could have
bargained for allocating the risk of fraudulent transactions with Visa before
signing its Visa contract."' 84 From the perspective of tort jurisprudence, this is
hardly a persuasive reason for extending the economic loss rule to bar the claim
of a party not in privity with the defendant. Considerations relating to both
fault and deterrence argued in favor of imposing liability on the negligent
merchant. 85 The effect of the court's decision was to leave blameworthy
conduct unpunished and undeterred and a foreseeable victim uncompensated-
all on the highly speculative ground that the plaintiff bank could have
convinced a third-party, Visa, at some earlier date, to change its policy on
issuer reimbursement of fraudulent charges.' 86 Tort liability should be imposed
to encourage safe practices, not to ensure that careless conduct goes
unremedied. Using the economic loss rule to insulate blameworthy persons,
such as a negligent merchant, from liability for economic losses foreseeably
caused to a third person does not defer to private ordering. Instead, it undercuts
important public policies relating to fault, deterrence, and compensation that
are the basis of American tort law.
The decision of the Banknorth court to deprive the plaintiff of relief in a
negligence action against the defendant, merely because the plaintiff could
have, hypothetically, contracted with a third party (there, Visa) to reduce or
eliminate its risk of economic losses from fraudulent transactions, comes
perilously close to saying that contract law is the exclusive source of protection
from economic losses. 187 That, emphatically, is not the law. American tort law
182. See id. at 213 (acknowledging that "liability [for economic losses] to third parties of
those who provide a service [may exist] ... when the third party was an intended beneficiary of
the service or it was well recognized that the third party would rely on the work performed").
183. Id. at 208.
184. Id. at 213 (emphasis added); see also id. at 214 (opining that the bank "could have
bargained against the risk it incurred, but did not").
185. See Vincent R. Johnson, Economics of Injury to Injury to Persons, Property, and
Relations, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND SOCIETY 769, 769 (David S. Clark ed., 2007) ("By
requiring actors to bear the costs of resulting harm... tort law affects the types of activities
persons engage in and the precautions they employ to avoid causing harm.").
186. See Banknorth, N.A. v. BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 2d 206, 213 (M.D.
Pa. 2006) ("Banknorth could have bargained for allocating the risk of fraudulent transactions
with Visa before signing its Visa contract.").
187. Cf id. ("[T]he point of the rule... [is] that in a commercial context parties are
expected to allocate the risk of loss through their contract, not supplement the contract with a
tort remedy.").
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routinely provides compensation for economic losses, such as lost wages and
diminished earning potential in cases of physical injury,188 as well as awards of
solely pecuniary damages in cases involving negligent misrepresentation,
professional malpractice, defamation, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, loss
of consortium, wrongful death, tortious interference, and unreasonable failure
to settle an insurance claim within policy limits, as mentioned earlier.' 89 Some
of those actions are based on intentionally tortious conduct, but others are
founded on negligence. Tort law compensates economic losses in these cases
because, within limits and subject to restrictions, it imposes duties not to inflict
economic losses. While compensation for economic losses is sometimes
incidental to certain forms of personal injury or property damage, either to the
plaintiff or to another, many times it is not. "Tort law has traditionally
protected individuals from a host of wrongs that cause only monetary
damage."'190 Contract law is not the only source of compensation for economic
losses, and it makes little sense to interpret the economic loss rule as though that were
the presumption.
In cases such as Banknorth, involving extensive pecuniary harm caused by
negligent data security,' 91 there may need to be limits on the liability of a defendant
who acts carelessly in order to protect the defendant from liability disproportionate to
fault. Cardozo's language from Ultramares Corp. v. Touche'92 comes to mind. He
wrote that law should not impose "liability in an indeterminate amount for an
indeterminate time to an indeterminate class."' 193 The point here is not that there
should be liability without limits, but that the economic loss rule should not be invoked
188. See, e.g., Anderson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 377 F. Supp. 136, 139-40 (E.D. La.
1974) (allowing recovery for lost earning capacity); see also Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d
558, 567 (9th Cir. 1974) ("The right to recover for economic losses which are parasitic to an
injury occurring to person or property is not questioned.").
189. See supra Part I.C (describing a variety of tort claims under which plaintiffs have
recovered for economic losses).
190. Giles v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 494 F.3d 865, 875 (9th Cir. 2007).
191. Some cases involving breaches of data security result in personal injury in the form of
emotional distress. See Scott v. Minneapolis Pub. Sch., Special Dist. No. 1, No. A05-649, 2006 WL
997721, at *1-2 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 18,2006) (affirming a substantial award of damages forpast and
future for pain, embarrassment, and emotional distress resulting from improper disposal of educational
records). Many data security cases concern economic loss. See generally Vincent R. Johnson, Data
Security and Tort Liability, J. INTERNET L., Jan. 2008, at 22, 26-30 (discussing the economic loss rule
and credit monitoring damages).
192. See Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 448-49 (N.Y. 1931) (holding that an
accountant's liability for negligence was "bounded by contract [with his employer]," whereas liability
for fraud could extend to creditors and investors relying upon accountant's certification).
193. Id. at444.
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based on the hypothetical possibility that the loss could have been prevented by a
contract that was never formed to foreclose an inquiry into the issues of tort duty and
scope of liability.
In every situation where economic losses occur, it is possible to say that the
plaintiff could have entered into some type of contractual arrangement--e.g., an
insurance policy, an indemnity agreement, or a release from liability--that would have
mitigated the damage. To seize upon those hypothetical actions, which never came to
pass, as a reason for applying the economic loss rule is to substitute imaginary
remedies for real ones and pretend that the facts were other than those that actually
occurred. The boundary line drawn by the economic loss rule should be between the
real exercise of freedom of contract and relief under tort principles. Imaginary
remedies have no place in the analysis.
In Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M Martinac & Co.,194 the Supreme Court of the
United States addressed a boundary-line issue relating to the economic loss rule. The
question was whether the builder of a vessel was liable for the destruction of
equipment that had been added to the vessel by an initial purchaser before it was resold
to the plaintiff' 95  The court held that the added equipment was "other
property"' 96 and that the economic loss rule did not bar recovery oftort damages.1 97 In
reaching that conclusion, the court found that hypothetical contracts that might have
been entered into by the builder or the purchasers were essentially irrelevant to the
analysis of the case. The court wrote:
Of course, nothing prevents a user/reseller from offering a warranty. But neither
does anything prevent a Manufacturer and an Initial User from apportioning
through their contract potential loss of any other items-say, added equipment or
totally separate physical property--that a defective manufactured product, say, an
exploding engine, might cause. No court has thought that the mere possibility of
such a contract term precluded tort recovery for damage to an Initial User's other
property. Similarly, in the absence of a showing that it is ordinary business practice
for user/resellers to offer a warranty comparable to those typically provided by
sellers of new products, the argument for... replacing tort law with contract
law... is correspondingly weak That is to say, respondents have not explained
why the ordinary rules governing the manufacturer's tort liability should be
194. See Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 875, 877-78 (1997) (holding
that the economic loss rule barred recovery against a ship builder by a second owner for damages to the
ship itself but not for "other property" added to the ship by the first owner).
195. Id at 877.
196. See supra Part 1l.C.2 (discussing the liability for harm to "other" property).
197. Saratoga Fishing, 520 U.S. at 877.
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supplanted merely because the user/reseller may in theory incur an overlapping
liability in contract. 9"
The economic loss rule should defer actual private ordering, not to a supposed
preference for contract principles that is inconsistent with a wealth of tort precedent
that imposes liability for economic losses (including sometimes pure economic losses)
and with the important public policies that animate American tort law.
C. Noncontractual Sources of Duty
1. Independent Duties Under Tort Law
In their efforts to articulate the limits of the economic loss rule, courts have
focused on the source of the duty allegedly violated for the purpose of drawing a
distinction.' 99 Often, they have articulated a bright-line test.2°° Thus, the Supreme
Court of Colorado wrote broadly:
Where there exists a duty of care independent of any contractual obligations, the
economic loss rule has no application and does not bar a plaintiff's tort claim
because the claim is based on a recognized independent duty ofcare and thus falls
outside the scope of the economic loss rule.20'
Elaborating on this theme, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania quoted a decision
of the Supreme Court of South Carolina with approval:
The question ... is not whether the damages are physical or economic. Rather, the
question of whether the plaintiffmay maintain an action in tort for purely economic
loss turns on the determination of the source of the duty plaintiff claims the
198. Id. at 882-83.
199. See, e.g., Town of Alma v. AZCO Constr., Inc., 10 P.3d 1256, 1262 (Colo. 2000)
("[W]hether the plaintiff may maintain an action in tort for purely economic loss tums on the
determination of the source of the duty [the] plaintiff claims the defendant owed."). TheAlma court
goes on to explain that "[a] breach of a duty which arises under the provisions of a contract between
the parties must be redressed under contract, and a tort action will not lie. A breach of a duty arising
independently of any contract duties between the parties, however, may support a tort action." Id.
200. See Indem. Ins. Co. ofN. Am. v. Am. Aviation, Inc., 891 So. 2d532,537 (Fla. 2004)("he
economic loss rule has not eliminated causes of action based upon torts independent ofthe contractual
breach even though there exists a breach of contract action.").
201. A.C. Excavating v. Yacht Club II Homeowners Ass'n, 114 P.3d 862,866 (Colo. 2005);
see also Congregation of the Passion v. Touche Ross & Co., 636 N.E.2d 503, 514 (111.1994)
("[Tihe doctrine is applicable to the service industry only where the duty of the party performing
the service is defined by the contract that he executes with his client. Where a duty arises outside
of the contract, the economic loss doctrine does not prohibit recovery in tort for the negligent
breach of that duty.").
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defendant owed. A breach of a duty which arises under the provisions ofa contract
between the parties must be redressed under contract, and a tort action will not lie.
A breach of duty arising independently of any contract duties between the parties,
however, may support a tort action.2° 2
Taking this approach, courts have held, for example, that actions for negligent
misrepresentation20 3 and conversion 4 are not barred by the economic loss rule
because the duties not to mislead or steal are rooted in general tort principles rather
than in the terms of the parties' agreement. Conversely, if the plaintiff alleges a breach
of fiduciary duty, but there is no fiduciary relationship independent of the defendant's
contractual obligations, the claim will be barred by the economic loss rule.2 °5
2. Purely Contractual Duties
Focusing on the source of duty is useful for various reasons, including the fact
that doing so weeds out cases involving nothing more than an allegedly negligent




202. Bilt-Rite Contractors, Inc. v. Architectural Studio, 866 A.2d 270, 288 (Pa. 2005)
(quoting Tommy L. Griffin Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Jordan, Jones & Goulding, Inc., 463 S.E.2d
85, 88 (S.C. 1995)).
203. Highland Crusader Offshore Partners, L.P. v. LifeCare Holdings, Inc., No. 3:08-CV
0102-B2008, 2008 WL 3925272, at *14 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 27, 2008). The court wrote:
If the defendant's duty to the plaintiff arises only from the contract between the
parties, plaintiff's claim is usually a contractual claim only.... On the other hand, if
the contract does not create the defendant's duty to the plaintiff, then the claim may
sound in tort as well as in contract.
Id. The Highland court found that tort claims relating to an amendment of a credit agreement were
not barred by the economic loss rule because the defendant's duty to disclose did not arise from the
contract. Id. at * 15. "Instead the duty arose because the Defendants allegedly made a partial or
misleading disclosure or a disclosure that later became misleading or untrue." Id.
204. See Alex Hofrichter, P.A. v. Zuckerman & Venditti, P.A., 710 So. 2d 127, 128-29 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (rejecting the defendant's argument that "where there is a contractual
relationship between the parties, a claim for civil theft will not lie absent a showing that the loss
from the theft is separate and distinct from the loss flowing from the breach of contract").
205. See Action Nissan, Inc. v. Hyundai Motor Am., No. 6:06-CV- 1747-Orl- 19KRS, 2008
WL 4093702, at *12 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 29, 2008) (granting summary judgment).
206. Cf Taylor, Bean & Whitaker Mortg. Corp. v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., No. 5:05-CV-260-
OC-GRJ, 2008 WL 3200286, at *3 n.27 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 6, 2008) ("Pennsylvania courts...
recognize the economic loss rule, which generally 'prohibits plaintiffs from recovering in tort
economic losses to which their entitlement flows only from contract."' (quoting Werwinski v. Ford
Motor Co., 286 F.3d 661, 671 (3rd Cir. 2002))); Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber & Mfg. Co., 384
S.E.2d 730, 737 (S.C. 1989) (stating in a case involving the construction of residential housing that
the "economic loss" rule bars claims based on duties "created solely by contract").
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Those types of cases should be governed by contract law.207 Indeed, for that very
reason, some authorities say that the "economic loss doctrine" should be termed the
"commercial loss doclrine. ' ' 20 8
Suppose, for example, that economic losses are caused by the defendant's failure
to publish a Yellow Pages ad209 or monitor an alarm system210 pursuant to a contract
between the parties. It makes sense that the plaintiff cannot sue for negligence, for the
only duties that have been breached are those created by the agreement.21'
Similarly, emotional distress and negligence claims arising solely from a
defendant's misperformance of obligations under a mortgage contract have
been held to be barred by the economic loss rule.212
a. Fraud Relating to a Contract
Courts have struggled with the issue of whether recovery in tort is barred
by the economic loss rule when the plaintiff alleges that fraud was committed
in the context of a contractual relation. Fraud in the inducement is generally
actionable because pre-contractual misrepresentation violates obligations
arising from tort principles that are independent of the terms of the agreement
the parties ultimately reach.21 3 In contrast, claims for fraud in the performance
of a contract are sometimes barred, presumably on the theory that they relate to
207. See Alejandre v. Bull, 153 P.3d 864, 868 (Wash. 2007) ("The rule prohibits plaintiffs
from recovering in tort economic losses to which their entitlement flows only from contract because
tort law is not intended to compensate parties for losses suffered as a result of a breach of duties
assumed only by agreement.") (intemal quotations omitted).
208. See Triton Realty Ltd. P'ship v. Almeida, No. 04-2335, 2005 WL 1984454, at *3 n.3
(R.I. Super. Ct. Aug. 17, 2005) ("One court has noted that the doctrine could also be termed the
'commercial loss' doctrine, explaining that a major justification of the doctrine 'is the desirability
of confining remedies for contract-type losses to contract law."' (citing All-Tech Telecom., Inc. v.
Amway Corp., 174 F.3d 862, 865 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, J.))); see also Alejandre, 153 P.3d at 873
(Chambers, J.) (opining that "[t]he economic loss rule is a misnomer").
209. See Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. DeLanney, 809 S.W.2d 493, 495 (Tex. 1991) (holding that
"failure to publish the advertisement was not a tort").
210. See U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Sonitrol Mgmt. Corp., 192 P.3d 543,547 (Colo. App. 2008)
(finding that the economic loss rule barred a negligence action because the "alleged tort duty and
the duty outlined in the contract are identical").
211. Id.
212. Davis v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., No. 34136-1-11,2007 WL 2039077, at *6 (Wash.
Ct. App. July 17, 2007).
213. See supra notes 203-04 and accompanying text (stating that negligent
misrepresentation is not barred by the economic loss rule because the duty not to mislead is
rooted in tort principles rather than in the terms of the parties' agreement).
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purely contractual duties. For example, the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida held that where the "alleged fraud [was] nothing
more than a refusal to divulge an intent to breach the contract," such fraud was
"not separate from the alleged breach," and, therefore, the fraud claim was
barred by the economic loss rule.214
Some claims of fraud simply restate in different terms that obligations
arising under the contract were breached. Thus, the economic loss rule should
normally bar recovery in tort if a fraud claim alleges simply that there was
misrepresentation about the characteristics or quantity of the goods sold under a
contract21 5 or the number of hours worked under a consulting agreement. 216 A
"mere contract claim cloaked in the language of tort" should be decided under
contract principles.2 17 Thus, courts have stated that, in the usual case, "a claim
arising out of the provisions of a contract must find remedy under contract
law, ' 218 and that "[t]he economic loss doctrine stands for the general rule that
'ordinarily, a breach of contract does not give rise to a tort action by the
promisee against the promisor.
''21 9
Still, it is incorrect to state that claims for fraud in the performance of a
contract are never actionable. Entry into a contract creates no license to commit
fraud. In Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. v. Dana Corp.,220 the Supreme Court
of California held that a helicopter manufacturer's fraud and intentional
misrepresentation claims against a supplier of clutch parts was not barred by the
economic loss rule where the supplier provided false certificates of
214. Welnia, LLC v. Bodymedia, Inc., No. 6:08-CV-742-Orl-3 IDAB, 2008 WL 3155148,
at *1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 4, 2008).
215. Cf Giles v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 494 F.3d 865, 880 (9th Cir. 2007)
(finding that a fraud claim not barred by the economic loss rule involved "extraneous" matters
and did not "duplicate" a contract suit).
216. See Pratham Design Innovation Pvt. Ltd. v. Infovision 21, Inc., No. 07-CV-13282
2007 WL 4557712, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 21,2007) (finding that the economic loss rule barred
recovery in tort because "[a]ssuming as true that InfoVision submitted false invoices and
charged for consulting work that was never performed, that is a breach of InfoVision's
contractual duty to perform under their professional services agreement").
217. Cf Giles, 494 F.3d at 880 (finding that a fraud claim not barred by the economic loss
rule involved "extraneous" matters and did not "duplicate" a contract suit).
218. White v. Holiday Kamper & Boats, No. 7:06-02362-HFF, 2008 WL 4155663, at *5
(D.S.C. Sept. 9, 2008).
219. Johnson v. Sprint Solutions, Inc., No. 3:08-CV-00054, 2008 WL 2949253, *3
(W.D.N.C. July 29, 2008) (quoting Carolina Ports Auth. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing, Co., 240
S.E.2d 345, 350 (N.C. 1978)).
220. See Robinson Helicopter Co. v. Dana Corp., 102 P.3d 268,272 (Cal. 2004) (holding
that the economic loss rule does not bar fraud and misrepresentation claims).
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conformance with manufacturing specifications. 221 Under the parties' contract
and applicable principles of aviation law, it was essential that the clutch parts
be produced in conformance with the terms of a design certificate.222 The
defendant changed the production process without notice by grinding the clutch
parts differently, thus affecting their hardness and increasing their failure
rate.223 The defendant nevertheless "continued to provide written certificates to
Robinson with each delivery of clutches [which stated] that the clutches had
been manufactured in conformance with Robinson's written specifications.
224
In explaining its decision holding that the economic loss rule did not bar the
tort claims, the court wrote:
Dana's tortious conduct was separate from the breach itself, which involved
Dana's provision of the nonconforming clutches. In addition, Dana's
provision of faulty clutches exposed Robinson to liability for personal
damages if a helicopter crashed and to disciplinary action by the FAA.
Thus, Dana's fraud is a tort independent of the breach.225
b. Informational Incentives and Other Factors
Holding that the breach of a purely contractual duty is actionable only
under contract law promotes the "efficient revelation of asymmetric
information., 226 This is true because in contract law there is no liability for
consequential economic damages without notice of special circumstances.227
Employing the economic loss rule to prevent recovery of economic damages in
tort forces parties to a contract to reveal relevant information that enables those
with whom they deal to assess how much care should be exercised to prevent a
loss. 228 However, the same analysis does not apply when an independent duty
221. See id. at 274 (finding that even though the tort claims related to performance of the
parties' contract, they were independent of the defendant's breach of contract).
222. Id. at 270.
223. Id. at 271.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 274.
226. See Miles, supra note 1, at 1816 ("[T]he rule of no liability for consequential damages
without notice of special circumstances... creates incentives for the efficient revelation of
asymmetric information.").
227. Id.
228. See Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951, 958 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.)
(discussing the type of costs a party to a contract might have to incur to protect itself from
liability for consequential losses if applicable rules did not create incentives to reveal relevant
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is imposed under tort law, because in that case there has been a judicial
determination that considerations relating to fault, deterrence, personal
responsibility, and compensation warrant the imposition of liability. In other
words, those factors outweigh whatever other general concerns the law might
have relating to the need for incentives to facilitate disclosure of relevant
information.
Permitting an action for economic losses based on an independent tort
duty does not necessarily mean that the defendant will be liable. Courts may
still inquire into all of the considerations which are taken into account in
determining whether a tort duty of care exists.229 Absent a finding of an
independent tort duty230 (and breach 231), the plaintiff has no cause of action.
D. Contractual Preemption of Tort Law
If tort law recognizes an independent source of duty that affords protection
to the plaintiff for purely economic losses, the plaintiff should be entitled to
relief for a breach of that duty unless, by entering into a contract with the
defendant, the plaintiff effectively waived that protection. A useful approach to
ascertaining whether contract law should displace tort principles in a case when
there is an independent tort duty is to think in terms of established notions of
preemption because that is what is actually taking place: Contract law is
preempting tort law. Put differently, the boundary line between what is
actionable in tort and what is actionable in contract is being moved.
There are at least three useful points of reference. The first concerns
preemption of state law by federal law, the second concerns displacement of
common law by statutes, and the third relates to written releases from tort
information).
229. See A.C. Excavating v. Yacht Club II Homeowners Ass'n, 114 P.3d 862, 868 (Colo.
2005) ("Included among such factors is the risk involved, the foreseeability and likelihood of
injury as weighed against the social utility of the defendant's conduct, the magnitude of the
burden of guarding against injury or harm, and the consequences of placing the burden upon the
defendant.") (citing Taco Bell, Inc. v. Lannon, 744 P.2d 43, 46 (Colo. 1987)).
230. See Indem. Ins. Co. ofN. Am. v. Am. Aviation, Inc., 891 So. 2d 532, 547 (Fla. 2004)
(Cantero, J.) (opining that even when the economic loss rule is restricted to limited contexts,
"the duty element will continue to weed out most claims for purely economic loss").
231. Cf Wrestlereunion, LLC v. Live Nation Television Holdings, Inc., No. 8:07-CV-
2093, 2008 WL 3048859, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 4, 2008) (holding that although the economic
loss rule does not generally bar claims alleging fraud in the inducement, there was no actionable
fraud because the misrepresentations at issue were not material, and therefore claims relating to
contractual performance were barred by the economic loss rule).
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liability. Each of these sources of guidance suggests that preemption of
established tort principles should be recognized only in limited circumstances.
Federal law does not preempt state tort law unless that is the "clear and
manifest" purpose of Congress. 232 Absent such a showing, a plaintiff is not
deprived of state tort claims.233 The text of a law can expressly indicate
Congress's intent to preempt or, in limited cases, that intent can be implied
from the language and structure of a statute.234 However, there is generally a
presumption against preemption by federal law.235 Recognizing that state law
serves a useful purpose as the primary source of tort remedies, courts are
reluctant to hold that federal preemption alters the balance between freedom of
action and liability that has been carefully crafted by the matrix of state statutes
and common law decisions that define tort obligations.
232. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,230 (1947) (citing Napier v. At. Coast
Line R.R. Co., 272 U.S. 605, 611 (1926)); see also Bernard D. Reams & Michael P. Forest,
Threading the Eye of the ERISA Needle: ERISA Preemption and Alternative Legal Schemes to
Fill the Regulatory Vacuum, 39 ST. MARY'S L.J. 277,282 (2007) ("Congress, finding authority
in the Supremacy Clause, has the power to invalidate state laws that conflict with federal
laws.").
233. Cf Rice, 331 U.S. at 218 (implying that, because a showing of a clear and manifest
purpose of Congress is required of federal law to preempt state tort law, a plaintiff's state tort
claims survive if no such showing is made).
234. Jonathan Freuh, Comment, Pesticides, Preemption, and the Return of Tort Protection,
23 YALE J. ON REG. 299,301 (2006) ("Congress's intent to preempt may be expressly stated on
the face of a federal law or it may be implied in two ways."). Freuh explains the two methods as
follows:
First, preemption by implication can occur when the scope of a federal law covers
the entire area that a state law regulates. Second, implied preemption can result
when federal and state regulations are actually in conflict; that is, when state law
either frustrates the purpose of federal law, or state and federal laws are such that an
actor cannot comply with both simultaneously.
Id.
235. See Colacicco v. Apotex Inc., 521 F.3d 253, 262-65 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding the
presumption against preemption applicable). The court in Colacicco went on to say:
[The] Supreme Court has stated: [in all pre-emption cases, and particularly in
those in which Congress has legislated in a field which the States have traditionally
occupied, we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States
were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress.
Id. (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,485 (1996)). Other cases address the same
issue. See Munoz v. Financial Freedom Senior Funding Corp., 567 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1159
(C.D. Cal. 2008) ("Typically, there is a presumption against federal preemption of state laws"
but that "presumption does not exist.. . 'when [a] state regulates in an area where there has
been a history of significant federal presence"' (quoting United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89,
108 (2000))).
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Likewise, statutory law replaces common law principles only when that is
the necessary implication of the actions of the legislature. As one
contemporary authority on New York state law explains:
Where a change in the common law is to be effectuated the legislative
intent to do so must be clearly and plainly expressed. When... a statute is
intended to abrogate a common law right or to confer a right not vested by
the common law, it will be so construed as not to go beyond the letter; and
not even to that extent unless it appears to be according to the spirit and
intention of the act.236
Similarly, contractual releases from tort liability are strictly construed
because they threaten to undermine the important public policies relating to
fault, proportionality, deterrence, individual responsibility, and compensation
that form the intellectual foundations of tort law.237 A release from liability for
physical harm is not valid unless it is clear, specific, and consistent with the
238public interest. A release is not expansively construed to abrogate the
plaintiff's rights under tort law merely because the release is a form of
contract.239 Rather, the plaintiffs rights under tort law are waived only to the
extent that the release contract so provides, and only if the waiver is consistent
with public policy240 and fair to the plaintiff. If these limitations regularly
apply to releases in personal injury or property damage suits, it is difficult to
see why the same should not be true with respect to purely economic losses. It
is hard to draw a persuasive distinction between personal injury or property
236. Cf. N.Y. STAT. § 301 cmt. (2008) (noting that the legislature is presumed to be
acquainted with the common law and that "statutes in derogation or in contravention" of the
common law are to be strictly construed, so as to change the common law only to the extent
"required by the words of the act"); see also Meade v. Freeman, 462 P.2d 54, 59-60 (Idaho
1969), overruled on other grounds, Alegria v. Payonk, 619 P.2d 135, 136 (Idaho 1980) ("The
rules of the common law are not to be changed by doubtful implication. But where the
implication is obvious it cannot be ignored. No statute is to be construed as altering the
common law farther than its words and circumstances import." (quoting Moon v. Bullock, 151
P.2d 765, 771 (Idaho 1944))).
237. See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 26, at 7-10 (discussing these and other public
policies that have shaped American tort law).
238. See, e.g., Rice v. Harley Davidson Inc., No. 1:04-CV-0481,2005 WL 1843250, at *2
(N.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2005) (noting that the courts "look with disfavor" on releases from liability);
Gross v. Sweet, 400 N.E.2d 306, 309 (N.Y. 1979) (discussing the "exacting standard" by which
courts measure the validity of releases).
239. See Dohm v. Ponderosa Riding Stables, Inc., 41 Pa. D. & C.2d 307,309-11 (Pa. C.P.
1966) (discussing exculpatory contracts).
240. See Winterstein v. Wilcom, 293 A.2d 821, 824-25 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1972)
(discussing considerations bearing upon whether a release is void as against public policy).
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damage suits, on one hand, and economic loss suits, on the other, based on the
degree of harm to the plaintiff.24 1 Economic losses can be devastating,
sometimes much more so than minor personal injury or damage to tangible
personal property.
These lessons relating to federal law preemption, statutory supercision of
common law, and written releases from liability suggest a useful approach to
dealing with issues relating to the boundary-line function of the economic loss
rule. Federal law must manifest a clear purpose to preempt state tort remedies;
statutory law supersedes the common law only to the extent necessary to give
effect to the statute; and a release from liability must clearly waive the
plaintiffs rights in order to obviate redress under tort principles. So, too, it
makes sense to hold that, with respect to the economic loss rule, the terms of a
contract between the parties abrogates otherwise applicable tort principles only
if the agreement clearly evidences an intent to do so or if such displacement is a
necessary consequence of the validity of the agreement. Further, even if these
conditions are met, relinquishment of rights under tort law should be
recognized only when depriving the plaintiff of those rights is consistent with
public policy. 242 Boilerplate provisions in standard-form contracts should be
subject to careful scrutiny.243 There is no reason for the law to presume that the
parties to a contract have bargained to relinquish rights that arise under tort
law. 24
241. Cf. Feinman, supra note 1, at 821 (arguing that tort policies relating to deterrence,
compensation, and fairness may be weaker in cases where there is no personal injury or property
damage, but they are not absent); Gaebler, supra note 85, at 610 ("One explanation sometimes
offered.., is that the integrity of the body and tangible property is more important than the
integrity of intangible economic interests and that economic interests are simply not worthy of
protection, at least against mere negligence. One difficulty with this explanation is that courts
do in fact protect economic interests against negligence in a number of circumstances.").
242. Cf. Johnson, supra note 32, at 300 ("[R]ights relating to protection of personal data
and notification of security breaches are not proper subjects for bargaining between the parties.
Many state laws... provide that a waiver of the data subjects' rights is against public policy,
and therefore void and unenforceable.").
243. Cf Feinman, supra note 1, at 824. Feinman states:
[T]he most common kind of contract today involves a standard form containing
many terms, which are poorly understood if read at all. A business that enters into
many such deals drafts the contract and presents it to the other party on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis. The law always has had difficulty accommodating adhesion
contracts to the paradigm of bargained contracts, but it is increasingly deferential to
them.
Id.
244. See id. at 823 (arguing that "[i]n many real contracting situations,... parties...
frequently fail to specify performance terms and allocate risks during the contracting process").
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E. Misinterpretation of Contractual Preemption
At least three lines of precedent have begun to emerge which undermine
the principles relating to preemption discussed above245 and threaten to
eviscerate the independent duty rule.246 Those lines of authority hold that the
violation of an independent duty is not actionable if the claim relates to the
subject matter of the contract, involves disappointed contractual expectations,
or requires proof of the same facts that would establish a breach of contract.
1. Relationship to the Subject Matter of the Parties' Contract
The clarity of the independent duty rule247 is sometimes diminished by
holdings that provide that even if the breached duty arises from tort principles,
rather than from the contract, a tort action is barred if losses relate to the subject
matter of the contract.248 Any such exception framed in terms of "subject
matter" relationship is obviously much too broad.
Consider, for example, the case of legal representation of a client by a
lawyer in a personal injury case pursuant to a retainer agreement. Conduct by
the lawyer amounting to negligent misrepresentation, professional negligence,
or negligently false defamatory statements may be related, in a real sense, to the
subject matter of a contract. Yet, those claims are not,249 and should not be,
barred by the economic loss rule. Indeed, it would be both odd and unrealistic
to expect clients to bargain with lawyers about not being misled, incompetently
represented, or defamed.2 5 °
245. See supra Part III.D (discussing the contractual preemption of tort law).
246. See supra Part III.C. 1 (identifying the independent duties present under tort law).
247. See supra Part III.C. 1 (explaining the independent duty rule).
248. See Gencor Indus., Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 988 So. 2d 1206, 1208 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2008) (finding that the critical inquiry is whether "the property damaged was the
subject of the contract, and the negligence was not 'independent from acts that breached the
contract."' (quoting HTP, Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, S.A., 685 So. 2d 1238, 1239
(Fla. 1996))). In Gencor Industries, a customer's subrogated property insurer brought
negligence and breach of contract claims against an asphalt plant manufacturer following an
explosion at a plant. Id. at 1207-08. The court held that any error in submitting a negligence
claim to the jury was harmless, even though the claim appeared to "be barred by the economic
loss rule because the parties were in contractual privity." Id. at 1209.
249. See supra Part I.C (listing several situations in which the plaintiff may recover for
purely economic damages stemming from negligence).
250. Cf. Robinson Helicopter Co. v. Dana Corp., 102 P.3d 268, 276 (Cal. 2004) ("No
rational party would enter into a contract anticipating that they are or will be lied to.").
Moreover, a lawyer shall not "make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to
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Moreover, it is easy to see how an exception based on relationship to the
"subject matter of the contract" could easily be improperly manipulated. In
Highland Crusader Offshore Partners, L.P. v. LifeCare Holdings, Inc.,251 tort
claims relating to a fee triggered by an amendment to a credit agreement were
allowed to go forward.252 The federal district court for the Northern District of
Texas found that because the credit agreement never mentioned or provided for
an amendment fee, the plaintiffs' loss was "not the subject matter of the
contract. ' 253 The court might just as easily have interpreted the subject matter
requirement differently and concluded that the amendment and fee both related
to the credit agreement, which was the subject matter of the contract, and that,
therefore, the action was barred by the economic loss rule. No purpose is
served by endorsement of a legal test so susceptible to manipulation. The
decision in Highland Crusader was correct, but it would have been better to
express the holding in language directly addressing whether the terms of the
contract preempted enforcement of independent duties under tort law. The
court found that tort remedies were available because the credit agreement
never mentioned or provided for an amendment fee.254 In effect, the court was
saying that the parties' contract was insufficiently specific to displace tort
remedies relating to such an amendment because the subject was never
addressed.255 There was no express or implicit preemption of tort remedies.
2. Claims Involving Disappointed Expectations
Courts sometimes hold that the economic loss rule bars relief in tort
because a plaintiff's claim involves merely disappointed expectations arising
from the plaintiff's bargain with the defendant. 256 At first blush, these holdings
a client for malpractice unless the client is independently represented in making the agreement."
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(h)(1) (2008).
251. See Highland Crusader Offshore Partners, L.P. v. LifeCare Holdings, Inc., No. 3:08-
CV-01012-B, 2008 WL 3925272, at *15 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 27, 2008) (finding that because the
credit agreement never mentioned an amendment fee, the plaintiff's loss was not related to the





256. See, e.g., Collins v. Reynard, 607 N.E.2d 1185, 1187-88 (I11. 1992) (Miller, C.J.,
specially concurring) ("The economic loss... doctrine denies a remedy in tort to a party whose
complaint is rooted in disappointed contractual or commercial expectations."). The argument
here is a bit different that in Part III.C.2. That section considers cases where there is no source
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are not surprising. In the case of a defective product, disappointed expectations
arise because the defect makes the product worth less by causing purely
economic losses. 257 Under well-established principles, a tort claim will not lie
if a product defect causes no harm to persons or other property.258 This is an
example of disappointed expectations not being actionable. However, the
example does not mean that disappointed expectations can never be the basis
for suit. There are many cases where a plaintiff's commercial expectations are
indeed "disappointed" and yet the economic loss rule does not bar relief in tort.
For example, if a potential defendant commits fraud in the inducement
incidental to a contract with the plaintiff, the plaintiff is sure to suffer
"disappointed expectations" related to the contractual bargain, yet most states
permit suit in tort for the fraud.259 It would be preferable to avoid the language
of "disappointed expectations" and to inquire directly into whether the harm in
question was within the scope of the actual bargaining by the parties and
whether recovery in tort was expressly or implicitly foreclosed by the plaintiff's
entry into the contract.
Some courts interpret the "disappointed expectations" test in a way that
threatens to improperly vitiate rights that otherwise independently exist under
tort law. For example, in Grams v. Milk Products, Inc.,26 the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin addressed the issue of whether farmers who fed their calves a
non-medicated version of a milk substitute could recover in tort from the
product's manufacturer and distributor for physical harm (poor growth and a
higher mortality rate) allegedly suffered by the calves.26' Under the usual rules
of products liability, the plaintiffs were entitled to tort compensation because
the allegedly defective product had caused harm to "other property.
262
However, the majority broadly concluded that "if claimed damages are the
of duty independent of contract law. This section focuses on cases where it is asserted that
contract principles preclude consideration of whether there is an independent duty under tort
law that would provide redress for economic losses.
257. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 21 (1998) (explaining that no
remedy can be sought under tort law when the defective product fails to harm a person or other
property).
258. See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing product-related economic losses).
259. See supra note 46 (listing cases from a variety of states that have allowed tort claims
alleging fraud in the inducement of a contract to proceed).
260. See Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 699 N.W.2d 167, 180 (Wis. 2005) (holding that
because the plaintiff's claims were based on their disappointed expectations of a product,
contract law, and not tort law, is the proper means to solve the dispute).
261. Id. at 170.
262. See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing liability for harm to "other" property).
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result of disappointed expectations of a bargained-for product's
performance.. . the plaintiff must rely upon contractual remedies alone."
263
Thus, even though the contract said nothing to preempt ordinary tort principles
relating to harm to other property, the plaintiffs were barred from asserting
those rights.2 4
On the facts of the case, the decision is explainable and perhaps even
understandable. The plaintiffs, upon inquiring about a cheaper milk substitute,
had opted to use one without medication which sold for a lower price than the
medicated version.265 The court found that the claimed economic damages
were "within the scope of the bargaining ' 266 between the parties. Therefore,
contract law provided the exclusive remedy. 267 As the court explained:
The record shows that the expected function of the milk replacer was to
provide sustenance for the Grams' calves. The Grams expected that the...
non-medicated replacer would properly nourish the calves, much as the old
replacer had, so that the calves would grow. This bargain was not about
milk replacer per se; it was about a product that would foster the healthy
development and growth of young calves.
26 8
What is troubling about Grams is not the result, but rather the court's
endorsement of fragmentary language from a Michigan case in its statement
that tort claims are barred by the economic loss rule if "the damage was within
the scope of bargaining or... 'the occurrence ofsuch damage could have been
the subject of negotiations between the parties."'269 Regarding harm to "other
property," there is a great difference between harm that was "within the scope
of bargaining" and harm that "could have been" bargained over. That
difference should be legally significant. While the former situation is a proper
occasion for preempting tort principles based on deference to private ordering,
the latter situation is not because in that case forfeiture of tort remedies was
neither expressly provided for by the agreement of the parties nor even the
subject of actual bargaining. In other words, if a party to a contract has not
relinquished independent tort rights through private ordering, it is unfair to say
263. Grams, 699 N.W.2d at 169.
264. Id. at 180.
265. Id. at 170.
266. Id. at 175.
267. Id. at 180.
268. Id. at 179.
269. Id. at 175 (quoting Neibarger v. Universal Coops., Inc., 486 N.W.2d 612,620 (Mich.
1992)) (emphasis added).
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that those independent tort rights have been lost because they might have been
bargained away.
Interestingly, the full quotation from the Michigan case, Neibarger v.
Universal Coops., Inc.,270 is more limited in its reach than the fragmentary, but
seemingly pivotal, reference in Grams. The Neibarger court wrote "[w]here
damage to other property was caused by the failure of a product purchased for
commercial purposes to perform as expected, and this damage was within the
contemplation of the parties to the agreement, the occurrence of such damage
could have been the subject of negotiations between the parties.
271
The careless, fragmentary quotation from Neibarger incorporated into the
Grams decision has launched Wisconsin courts on an unfortunate and
misguided line of inquiry. Courts have interpreted Grams to mean that:
The "disappointed expectations" test is directed at determining whether the
purchaser should have anticipated the need to seek protection against loss
through contract. This test focuses on the expected function of the product
and whether, from the purchaser's perspective, it was reasonably
foreseeable that the product could cause the damage at issue ....
Because the focus is on "reasonable foreseeability," it follows that an
objective standard applies: Should a reasonable purchaser in the plaintiff's
position have foreseen the risk?
272
Under this formulation, there seems to be a presumption that by entry into
a contract all tort rights are forfeited and that the only remedy for foreseeable
harm (the traditional province of tort law) is via contractual protection. The
presumption should be just the opposite. Independent duties under tort law
should be presumed to be actionable, unless they have been voluntarily
relinquished. The proffered formulation sweeps so widely in addressing
foreseeable economic harm that it does not draw the boundary line between
contract law and tort law, but rather substitutes contract law for tort law in a
wholesale manner. Doing so is imprudent because it undercuts the policies on
fault, deterrence, proportionality, individual responsibility, and fair
compensation that properly find application in cases when questions of duty
270. See Neibarger v. Universal Coops., Inc., 486 N.W.2d 612,623 (Mich. 1992) (holding
that because the "damages sought in the cases are economic losses resulting from the
commercial sale of goods the plaintiff's exclusive remedies are provided by the UCC").
271. Id. at 620 (emphasis added). This full quotation appears elsewhere in the Grams
opinion. Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 699 N.W.2d 167, 174 (Wis. 2005).
272. Foremost Farms USA Coop. v. Performance Process, Inc., 726 N.W.2d 289, 295
(Wis. Ct. App. 2006).
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and scope of liability are resolved by reference to well-established tort
principles. As explained above, tort law frequently provides redress for
economic harm,273 and there is no reason to assume that pure economic harm is
compensable only under contract principles.
3. Claims Arising from the Same Facts as Contractual Breach
Some cases hold that remedies for a violation of an independent tort duty
cannot be recovered if the tort claim arises out of the same set of facts as a
breach of contract claim.27a These cases appear to reflect a misunderstanding of
purpose of economic loss rule. Viewed from the boundary-line perspective,
that purpose is not to relegate the parties to a contract to exclusively contractual
remedies for pure economic loss. Rather, it is to ensure that the adjudication of
tort remedies defers to private ordering.275 If the parties have not, by the terms
of their agreement, preempted remedies based on independent tort duties, there
is no reason to hold that such relief is foreclosed merely because a claim arises
from the same facts that might support a breach of contract action.
For example, in In re Gosnell Development Corp.,276 the United States
District Court for the District of Arizona had before it a case where the plaintiff
was the general partner of a partnership involved in development of land.277 Of
course, partners are ordinarily subject to suit for breach of fiduciary duty.
278
However, the court held that the plaintiffs breach of fiduciary duty claim was
barred by the economic loss rule because it arose "out of the contract and the
same set of facts as its breach of contract claim. ''279 In effect, the court's
decision seems to have erased the law of partner fiduciary duty insofar as it
applied to the parties. Yet, the partnership agreement contained no provisions
273. See supra Part III.B (citing several examples of how American tort law often remedies
economic harm).
274. See, e.g., In re Gosnell Dev. Corp., No. CV-04-998-PHX-RGS, BK-97-10778-PHX-
CGC, 2007 WL 1238923, at *4 (D. Ariz. Apr. 27,2007) (finding that a fiduciary duty claim was
barred because it arose out of the same facts as a breach of contract claim).
275. See Feinman, supra note 1, at 819 (finding that the economic loss rule reflects "the
normative priority of private ordering principles over public regulation and of contract law over
tort law").
276. In re Gosnell, 2007 WL 1238923, at *4 (holding that a fiduciary duty claim was
barred because it arose out of the same facts as a breach of contract claim).
277. Id. at*1.
278. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
279. In re Gosnell, 2007 WL 1238923, at *4.
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that would have supported a finding that the parties intended to exempt their
agreement from such basic provisions of common law.280 The proper course
would have been for the court to directly address the question of whether
assertion of independent duties under partnership fiduciary-duty principles was
expressly or implicitly preempted by the terms of the parties' agreement. That
inquiry cannot be framed in terms of whether a claim for breach of fiduciary
duty arises out of the same facts as a breach of contract claim.
F. Lack of Bargaining Power
In their construction and application of the economic loss rule, courts have
repeatedly emphasized the inappropriateness of employing the rule to bar the
claims of persons who never had a real opportunity to bargain for contractual
protection for economic losses. Thus, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts has remarked that "[w]hen the economic loss rule has been
applied, the parties usually were in a position to bargain freely concerning the
allocation of risk.",281 Similarly, in another case, Chief Justice Miller of the
Illinois Supreme Court explained "[t]he cases in which... [the economic loss
doctrine] has been applied are grounded on the notion that the complaining
party, if he wished protection against the particular type of harm suffered, could
have bargained for a guarantee or warranty against it."
282
Concerns about lack of bargaining power explain why many courts have
found the economic loss rule inapplicable to tort actions against
professionals.283 However, the problem of lack of bargaining power is more
widespread.
Although some persons have argued that contractual principles should
supplant contemporary tort law in a wide range of circumstances, 284 the history
280. Id. at*1.
281. Clark v. Rowe, 701 N.E.2d 624, 626 (Mass. 1998).
282. Collins v. Reynard, 607 N.E.2d 1185, 1189 (I11. 1992) (Miller, C.J., specially
concurring).
283. See id. ("It is difficult to apply that concept [of free bargaining for protection] in the
area of legal representation, where the purpose of retaining counsel is to obtain a representative
who will function as a fiduciary and will act professionally, with reasonable skill and ability, to
advance the client's interests.").
284. See PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
195-227 (1988) (discussing neo-contractual principles), reviewed in Vincent R. Johnson,
Liberating Progress and the Free Marketfrom the Spectre of Tort Liability, 34 Nw. U. L. REv.
1026, 1036-48 (1989).
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of American law in the twentieth century285 counsels the exercise of caution to
courts and legislatures faced with those entreaties. 286 Contractual bargaining
over protection from economic harm is often slow, difficult, and expensive,
and, in many cases, a practical impossibility. Consumers engage in
multitudinous transactions, and they often lack important information about the
risks they face to be able to negotiate intelligently over protection from those
dangers. As one court recently noted, "[i]t goes without saying that many
individual consumers have no meaningful ability to negotiate with product
manufacturers and distributors."287 Of equal importance, the persons with
whom consumers conduct transactions-cashiers at discount stores, registrars
in university bursars' offices, and agents at rental apartments-typically lack
authority, training, or incentives to vary the terms of what are essentially
intended to be take-it-or-leave-it transactions.
Tort law can offer a more efficient path than contract law to deterring and
compensating some forms of economic harm. Consider for example the
problems posed by failure to protect computerized personal information and the
resulting losses caused by identity theft. Because of the numerous entities
which maintain databases (e.g., credit card issuers, universities, governmental
agencies, and social networking websites), it would be virtually impossible for
any individual to negotiate with all relevant database possessors over the duty
to exercise care to protect personal information from unauthorized access.
However, the recognition of a tort duty obliging database possessors to protect
personalized information from hacking has the potential to encourage safe
practices by a wide range of potential defendants, as well as provide a
mechanism for distributing losses when they occur.288 Contract law principles
could not be nearly as efficient in performing that role.
Relegating persons to exclusively contract remedies for purely economic
losses will effectively immunize defendants from liability in a wide range of
285. See Vincent R. Johnson, Tort Law in America at the Beginning of the 21st Century, 1
RENmi~MN U. L. REv. 237, 264 (2000) (discussing the remarkable transformation of American tort
law during the twentieth century which today means that "life is relatively safe from risks of
accidental harm, and that the victims of the accidents that do occur have a reasonably fair
chance of obtaining redress").
286. See Feinman, supra note 1, at 823-24 (arguing that "we are in the midst of an
historical shift, in which contract law is becoming increasingly less sensitive to the complexities
of private ordering").
287. Foremost Farms USA Coop. v. Performance Process, Inc., 726 N.W.2d 289,297 n.8
(Wis. Ct. App. 2006).
288. See Johnson, supra note 32, at 272-80 (arguing in favor a common law duty to
protect personal data).
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cases. This is undesirable for, in many cases, unnecessary economic harm
should be deterred through legal principles that create an incentive for safe
practices through risk of liability.
G. Waiver of the Economic Loss Rule
Insofar as its boundary-line function is concerned, the economic loss rule
is premised on a preference for private ordering.289 It, therefore, makes sense
that the protections afforded by the rule must be subject to waiver by agreement
of the parties. In PNC Bank, National Ass 'n v. Colonial Bank, NA.,290 a loan
participation agreement expressly provided that the defendant would not be
liable "except for... material breach of this Agreement or its own gross
negligence, bad faith or willful misconduct. '" 291 The federal district court for
the middle district of Florida concluded that the "plain meaning" of the
language of the agreement controlled and, therefore, the defendant "effectively
waived any protection that the economic loss doctrine may have afforded it




The economic loss rule performs a valuable function in determining which
economic losses are actionable only under contract law and not under tort
principles.293 However, just as contract law should not be allowed to drown in
289. See Feinman, supra note 1, at 817 ("[T]he principal explanation for the rise of the
economic loss rule ... is a preference for private ordering over public regulation.").
290. See PNC Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v. Colonial Bank, N.A., No. 8:08-CV-611-T-24MSS,
2008 WL 2917639, at *5 (M.D. Fla. July 24, 2008) (allowing for the waiver of economic rule
protections).
291. Id. at *2.
292. Id. at *3. Interestingly, the court did not insert the adjective "gross" before
negligence, even though the loan participation agreement referred to liability for "gross
negligence." Id.
293. See Robinson Helicopter Co. v. Dana Corp., 102 P.3d 268,273 (Cal. 2004) ("Quite
simply, the economic loss rule 'prevent[s] the law of contract and the law of tort from dissolving
one into the other."' (quoting Rich Prods. Corp. v. Kemutec, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 937, 969
(E.D. Wis. 1999))).
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a "sea of tort,, 2 94 the principles of tort law should not be permitted to drown in
a "sea of contract.
2 95
In interpreting and applying the economic loss rule in cases involving
contractual relationships, the rule's boundary-line function can be properly
performed only by focusing on the actual conduct of the parties to the litigation.
An agreement to which the plaintiff is not a party provides no basis for limiting
whatever rights the plaintiff may have under tort law.296 Hypothetical remedies
under nonexistent contracts with third parties or a supposed preference for
compensating pure economic loss solely under contract principles have no
place in the analysis.297 The determinative factor is the actual conduct of the
parties viewed in the context of the obligations that tort law sometimes
imposes.
If the defendant has breached a tort duty that arises independent of
contractual obligations, 98 that breach should be actionable unless the parties'
contract expressly or by necessary implication preempts such relief.299 Absent
such preemption, relief in tort should be available regardless of whether the
economic losses involve disappointed commercial expectations300 or are related
to the subject matter of the contract3 °' or facts which might establish breach of
contract.30 2 Of course, the economic loss doctrine is ajudicial construct. It is,
therefore, waivable by agreement of the parties.
It is essential that the economic loss rule be crafted and applied in a
manner that adequately accommodates the "goals of tort [law]-deterrence of
negligent conduct, interpersonal considerations of fairness, and
294. E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858,866 (1986); see also
GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 87 (1974) (suggesting that contract law was being
"reabsorbed into the mainstream of 'tort"').
295. Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 699 N.W.2d 167, 180 (Wis. 2005) (opining that
"courts... should be mindful to prevent... tort from drowning in a sea of contract").
296. See supra Part III.A.1 (discussing the rights of economic victims not in contractual
privity with the economic injurer).
297. See supra Part III.B (discussing hypothetical remedies under nonexistent contracts).
298. See supra Part III.C. 1 (discussing non-contractual duties present under tort law).
299. See supra Part III.D (explaining the contractual preemption of tort law).
300. See supra Part III.E.2 (exploring claims involving disappointed expectations).
301. See supra Part III.E.I (arguing that courts sometimes mistakenly impose the
contractual preemption of tort law simply because the tort claim is related to the subject matter
of the contract).
302. See supra Part III.E.3 (arguing that relief in tort should sometimes be available even if
the same facts are used to establish a breach of contract claim).
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compensation-that support liability ' ' in compelling cases. Unfortunately,
attainment of this objective entails a high degree of doctrinal complexity. As
Professor Robert Rabin has remarked "[i]t would undoubtedly be more
aesthetically satisfying to have an economic loss rule that could be invoked
without micro-scrutiny of competing policy considerations.... But bright-line
rules grounded in single-dimension justifications would lead to undesirable
policy outcomes. ,304
303. Rabin, supra note 1, at 869.
304. Id.

